Pakistan Historian

Why was Liaqat Ali Khan Assassinated? Who murdered Shaheed e Millat?

Noticias de Rupia | Nouvelles de Roupie | Rupiennachrichten | новости рупии | 卢比新闻 | Roepienieuws | Rupi Nyheter | ルピーニュース | Notizie di Rupia | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا | RUPEE NEWS | February 27th, 1997 | Moin Ansari | معین آنصآرّی | اخبار روپیہ |Published Feb. 26th 1997. Updated Feb. 20th, 2008 with recently declassified US documentation which raise the question of CIA involvement in the death of LAK.

(http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/pakistan/pakintrigue.htm#liaquat).

The events of December 27th 2007 when the 3rd Pakistani Prime Minister was assasinated in Rawalpindi makes this research very poignant. Two decades ago we have read more about who shot JR and a lot less about who shot one of our greatest freedom fighters of Pakistan. We all wondered who shot Khan Liaqat Ali Khan? The American press is always trying to discover who actually planned the assassination of President John Fritzgerald Kennedy. The media is obsessed with JFKs murder even though the murderer was captured. The Pakistani media is silent about Liaqat Ali Khan. The same forces that were responsible for the death of Benazir Bhutto are responsible for the death of Shahed Millat.

Liaqat Ali Khan was the liberator of Kashmir. In 1947, Liaqat Ali Khan raised a fist at India warning it of staying away from Pakistan. As long as the fist was alive no neighboring country could dare lift a finger at Pakistan.

Jinnah and Liaqat at the 1940 Lahore Resolution (Pakistan Reolution)

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE.

We have researched this issue at length. In the abscence of an on the spot autopsy, the cicumstancial and political evidence points to the political enemies of Khan Liaqat Ali Khana and Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The feudlas of many areas did not support the creation of Pakistan. Urban voters were free to vote, and the wholehearted supported, Iqbal, Jinnah and Liaqat. If we look at the plitical landscape of the Subcontinetal politics, we see the following:

1. Jinnah, Iqbal, and Liaqat were at odds with the anti-Pakistan, pro-Congress elements who wre supported by the likes of Sir Chottu Ram and the Unionist party. Iqbal and Liquat were responsible for the creation of Muslim League in every town and village of the Subcontinent, and had transformed the League from an eletist group to a national party.
2. Jinnah, Liaqat. Iqbal, and the Muslim Leageu won the day, and destroyed the Hyatt-Tiwana conspiracies led by their cohorts the Congress and SIr Choutta Rams Zamindara party
3. Hyatt and Tiwana lost to the Muslim League but kept the vengence in thier harts.
4. Liaqat Ali Khan did not allow the UK and the US Pakistani facilities to attack Iran. There is a lot of suspicion on the CIA on this matter. Recent declassified documents shed light on a lot of information on this.
5. According to Gauhar Ayub, Liqat Ali Khan had talked to King Zahir Shah who had agreed to a confederation with Pakistan.
6. The Finance Minsiter and openly defied Liaqat Ali Khan trying to run Foreign Affairs. He had the most to gain from the death of Liaqat Ali Khan and tried to come to power.
7. The Khaksar Tehrik and the Socialist Coalition wanted to to turn Pakistani into a Socialistic republic.
8. Liqat Ali Khan was supposed to announce land reforms and a close relationship with the Muslim world.
9. There is tremendous suspicious on Mushtaq Muhamamd, and Ghulam Muhammad. Ghulam Muhammad was supposedly the CIA man.
10. Both Jinnah and Liaqat faced numerous asassination attempts on thier lives by the same Unionist party or their fascist supports the Khaksars.
11. Jinnah escaped the attempts, and Liaqat did not.

Noticias de Rupia | Nouvelles de Roupie | Rupiennachrichten | новости рупии | 卢比新闻 | Roepienieuws | Rupi Nyheter | ルピーニュース | Notizie di Rupia | PAKISTAN LEDGER | پاکستاني کھاتا | RUPEE NEWS | November 27th, 2008 | Binu Karunakaran | اخبار روپیہ |

WHO SHOT LAK?..CIA CONNECTION

Under headline reading “Is Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination result of a deep-laid American conspiracy?”, leftist Urdu daily Bhopal named Nadeem published article October 24 charging US with responsibility. Summary article follows:

[...]It was learned within Pakistani Foreign Office that while UK pressing Pakistan for support re Iran, US demanded Pakistan exploit influence with Iran and support Iran transfer oil fields to US. Liaquat declined request. US threatened annul secret pact re Kashmir. Liaquat replied Pakistan had annexed half Kashmir without American support and would be able to take other half. Liaquat also asked US evacuate air bases under pact. Liaquat demand was bombshell in Washington. American rulers who had been dreaming conquering Soviet Russia from Pakistan air bases were flabbergasted. American minds set thinking re plot assassinate Liaquat. US wanted Muslim assassin to obviate international complications. US could not find traitor in Pakistan as had been managed Iran, Iraq, Jordan. Washington rulers sounded US Embassy Kabul. American Embassy contacted Pashtoonistan leaders, observing Liaquat their only hurdle; assured them if some of them could kill Liaquat, US would undertake establish Pashtoonistan by 1952. Pashtoon leaders induced Akbar undertake job and also made arrangements kill him to conceal conspiracy. USG-Liaquat differences recently revealed by Graham report to SC; Graham had suddenly opposed Pakistan although he had never given such indication. [...] Cartridges recovered from Liaquat body were American-made, especially for use high-ranking American officers, usually not available in market. All these factors prove real culprit behind assassin is US Government, which committed similar acts in mid-East. “Snakes” of Washington’s dollar imperialism adopted these mean tactics long time ago. Confidential Telegram No. 1532 from New Delhi Embassy, Oct. 30, 1951

Recommend Department ignore article summarized in Delhi’s 1532. It is compilation of utter falsehoods whose vituperation is some degree worse than articles that appear from time to time in Bombay’s Commie-line “Blitz”. To issue any statement labeling the facts in the article as lies will only give Nadeem an importance it does not merit. The investigation into background of Liaquat’s assassination is being conducted with extreme care and well guarded secrecy. Gurmani tells me an intercept has been obtained which if backed up by further material may reveal the assassination had some inspiration and followed the pattern of Razmara’s assassination in Teheran. Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embasssy, Oct. 31, 1951

Since article apparently not rpt not widely circulated, Department believes preferable not rpt not issue public denial. In its discretion, however, Embassy might informally mention case MEA with comment story so preposterous no rpt no public denial intended. Would be interesting to know whether this story of character which led adoption recent press law. Ownership management NADEEM should be discreetly be investigated. Confidential Telegram from State Dept., Nov. 1, 1951

Soviet Press today carried Prague Despatch reporting Rude Pravo article based Afghan press agency “Bahtar” information re assassination Liaquat Ali. Despatch states after escaping Afghanistan due murders and other crimes “Said Akbar ran to India and there under protection British authorities which gave him refuge in Abbotabad and provided him money. After partition India Akbar remained in Pakistan where he continued make use protection of certain British circles.” “These facts adduced by Afghan press supporting position that murder Liaquat Ali was result intrigue of imperialists in Asian countries.” Secret Telegram from Moscow Embassy, Nov. 3, 1951 [only first page located]

The Embassy questions the premise stated in the first sentence of the Airgram under reference (“Lack of spontaneous anti-Indian and anti-Afghan popular outburst over both July war scare and Liaquat’s assassination suggests feeling on Kashmir and Afghan disputes mostly government inspired.”) … The anti-Afghan agigation that spontaneously sprang up on October 16-17 was effectively stopped by the GOP’s prompt exercise of its official and unofficial powers of censorship over the press, even to the extent of preventing reference after October 17 to the assassin’s Afghan origin. Popular Feeling in Pakistan on Kashmir and Afghan Issues, Nov. 10, 1951

One almost never hears about the culprits in the assassination of Khan Liaqat Ali Khan…. the first victim of our nascent nation. After his death democracy was forced to fail and dictators ruled the Pakistani landscape.

Since the autopsies done on the body of the Khan has NOT revealed much, let us do an autopsy of the politics of our time. There have been several books written on the man, and a wealth of information is revealed in them.

LIAQAT ALI KHAN, THE MAN, ONE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS, THE FREEDOM FIGHTER, THE LIBERATOR OF KASHMIR & THE FIRST PRIME MINISTER

Liaqat Ali Khan was a born in a rich family, but he gave up his lands for freedom and for Pakistan.

All through the forties, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah had picked patriots who would lead the nation to freedom. These men were loyal not only to Quaid-e-Azam and the Muslim League, these men were loyal to the cause of Pakistan. Both created and led the Muslim League and battled the British and engaged the Congress for the independent nation of Pakistan. Throughout the trials and tribulations, Liaqat Ali Khan and Jinnah went through one constitutional crises after the other and faced the elections. From the Khilafat movement, to the cause of the separate electorate, through the Cabinet Mission Plan, through the pre-partition governments, the Khan and Jinnah led the Muslim League and the nation towards Pakistan.

In little towns and in big villages, the All India Muslim League opened offices and built a grass roots movement that was supported by the Mussalmans of Bharat. Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan were painfully aware that the Muslims had no voice in the press. In order to combat the propoganda of its enemies, the Muslim League needed a voice. The created from scratch newspapers that would carry the Muslim League message. In 1945, the created the newspaper called ‘Dawn’. They also created the paper called “Pakistan Times’ and they created other papers called Patriots etc.

Here is a message from the Honorable Liaqat Ali Khan, Premier of Pakistan. Dated Delhi, 5th August, 1947:

” Now that the great day has come when we have not only achieved freedom from foreign domination but also regained our long lost opportunity for national development. I wish to convey to our people a message of goodwill and good cheer on this day when the Muslim state of our dreams has become a reality. Let us not forget that his has been achieved not by the efforts of Muslims in Pakistan alone, but even more by the sufferings of millions living in Muslim minority provinces. I hope that although henceforth the frontiers of the two states will divide the Muslims of this Subcontinent, the ties of brotherhood will endure, because the Islamic fraternity knows no political or geographical barriers. I have no doubt that the Muslims of Pakistan will ever regard the Muslims of Hindustan as part of themsleves and give them equal opportunities in their own state. I am confident also that the Muslims in Hindustan will be loyal citizens of their state and paly an important and honorable role in the progress and prosperity.” Sd. Liaqat Ali Khan.

Liaqat Ali Khan was uncorrptable. Here is an editorial printed in the Nation on Friday, February 28, 1997, Lahore, “Banish the factotums, sir”, written by Khalid Hasan :

“In the early years of Pakistan, the leaders lived with simplicity. Mr Liaquat AliKhan, who used to be rich in his own right before independence, lived simply. He was accessibleand there were hardly any barriers between him and those who considered him the Quaid-i-Azam’s heir and his most trusted deputy. We all know that when the Nawabzada died, he had no money in the bank. That is the example our present-day leaders need to follow and not that of oriental potentates, colonial overlords and slave plantation kings.”

As Prime Minster of Pakistan Liaqat Ali secured the borders of Pakistan, LIBERATED one third of Kashmir (and would have liberated ALL of it if HIS plan had worked), and internationalized (through agreements with the USA) the boundaries of Pakistan by ensuring that the USSR through its proxies (India or Afghanistan) could not cross them.

LIAQAT TAKES OVER A PRECARIOUS POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

1947, was a precarious time for Pakistan. The newly won freedom was in jeopardy. The flame of Pakistani Muslim liberty was in danger of being extinguished. Liaqat Ali Khan became prime minister of Pakistan when the anti-Pakistan Unionist loyalists (who had been in cahoots with the Indian National Congress) landlords and the anti-Muslim League feudals were waiting in the wings to take over the political machinery of the new country. This was an accident waiting to happen.

In Sindh the landlords were mostly Hindu and these landlords fled to India. In the Punjab and Sarhad they were the Badshah Khans and the Khizar Hyatts who had opposed the Quaid-e-Azam.

After the death of Quaid-e-Azam the feudals wanted to take over the nascent country. The feudals had opposed Pakistan. For the feudals the only roadblocks to power were the patriots who had led the Pakistan movement. I.I. Chundrigarh, Feroze Khan Noon and Khan Liaqat Ali Khan. Once the Bengali leadership of the Muslim League was harassed and removed, then it was necessary to begin removing the political infra-structure of Pakistan that had been built by the Quaid-e-Azam himself. The Muslim League leaders faced the wrath of the feudals. The Quaid and Khan Liaqat Ali Khan had defeated the feudals in their Unionist party which was in an alliance with the Indian National Congress (INC). Now the feudals were out to take revenge from the leadership of the Muslim that had shepherded the nation to freedom.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah had terminal cancer and he died an early death. The actual circumstances of the death of the Quaid are shrouded in mystery, confusion and perhaps even conspiracy.

Several Pakistani prime ministers tried to illegally take over the reigns of government through extra-constitutinal means, but the machinations of the feudals did not allow them to rule. These machinations were the earliest seed of discontent sown into the minds of the Bengalis because they saw the Bengali leadership of the Muslim League harassed and shunted out of the Muslim League.

Pakistan was born under the Mountbatten-Indian premise that the country would last a few weeks and the Muslims would learn their lesson and then come begging back to India to take them back. In fact Lord Mountbatten had offered and insisted on becoming the joint Governor General of both India and Pakistan. This unique head of both the states would have facilitated the early demise of the state of Pakistan. Quaid-e-Azam and Liaqat Ali Khan saw through the ruse and asked Lord Mountbatten whose anti Pakistan and anti-Muslim stand had already been proven several times over not to become the governor general of Pakistan.

EXTERNAL THREAT TO PAKISTAN NULLIFIED THROUGH STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

Many Hindus and Gandhi did not oppose Pakistan. Some like Patel did. The opponents were fierce vitriolic and vociferous. Right after Pakistan was created, some of the radical Hindus considered this a temporary situation and called it a temporary partition of the country of India. When the new country lasted for a few months, India began flexing its muscles. One of the first test of Pakistani sovereignty came when India devalued her currency and wanted Pakistan to do the same. Liaqat Ali Khan refused, and angry India tightened the screws and imposed a trade embargo against Pakistan. All cross border trade came to a halt. This was the initiation of cessation of trade that has still not been really revived, even in modern times.

With China still embroiled in its communist struggle, Asia was recognized as India. In British eyes, India was the major power in the India. In the early nineteenth century, America proudly proclaimed that “it was manifest destiny that the USA should span from the Atlantic to the Pacific.” The Soviet Union extended from the Pacific to the Atlantic. With British imperial might, and India the crown jewel of the empire, India too saw her destiny as great as the superpowers.

THE NEHRU DOCTRINE FACES LIAQAT ALI KHANS PATRIOTIC FIST

The Nehru doctrine was a natural extension of Indian nationalism. Nehrus dreams of India as one of hte major nations of the world are elequently quoted in his letters to his daughter “Glimpses of World History”, a very welll written book on the history of the world. The stature of Nehrus intelleigence can be judged from the fact that Nehru wrote the book from memory while he was in jail.

To many Indians religion was a personal matter and did not want the state to interfere in it. Riightly or wrongly they saw Jinnah using the ruse of religion to gain power. Some Indians felt that Indian nationalism and dreams had run aground by the creation of Pakistan. “Partition” had stopped the land routes to Europe and divided the focus of its attntion. Had she been cut down to size? Reeling from partiton, Patel started to consolidate the rest of the “nation”. Nehru would not allow 550 Indias. Nehru and Patel wanted to create the Indian nationality by creating a contiguous Subcontinent. She had taken over Kashmir, Junagarh and had taken over Hydrabad. India was threatening Pakistan. Pakistani nationalism now tested the limits of Indian consolidation. Liaqat Ali Khan looked for cracks in the consolidation. Liaqat Ali Khan saw what was coming and used the tribesmen to take advantage of the rebellion in Kashmir and liberate the state. All Kashmiris remember Liaqat Ali Khan with fondness because he is the real liberator of Azad Kashmir. Were it not for Liaqat Ali Khan ALL of Kashmir would today be part of India.

Like Nehru, Khan was also embroiled in the task of nation building. Like Nehru, Khan also faced daunting odds. Unlike Nehru, Khan was the ruler of a state with very powerful feudal enemies. These enemies had sworn the destruction of the country. These feudals saw Khan between them and their allies and friends the Indian National Congress. Khan Liaqat Ali Khan began to create a sovereign nation. He saw the vision to create natural and artifical boundaries around the country. He ordered the digging of the BRB canal along the Wagah border. The Indians were to learn the importance of what they call “Khawjal Canal” during the 1965 war because this canal provided Pakistan a natural defense barrier against the advancing Indian army. When things got too hot for India in Kashmir and Pakistani troops under Tikka Khan and the freedom fighters were only 35 miles away from Srinagar, India wanted to cross the international border at Batapur and Run of Katch. The Americans in 1965 had guaranteed to Pakistan that Kashmir was disputed territory and India would not cross the international border. India tired to but the rangers kept them at bay along the BRB canal that was designed and built during the reign of Khan Liaqat Ali Khan

It was under these circumstances that Khan Liaqat Ali Khan took the reigns of office. He struggled to do the following:

1) Guard Pakistan against a belligerent India which wanted to reintegrate Pakistan into India

2) Watch the back of Pakistan against the Indian ally Zahir Shah of Afghanistan

3) Tried to create an external strategic alliance with the USA and sold the idea to the West that Pakistan would be a reliable bulwark against the socialistic India-USSR nexus

LIAQAT ALI KHAN NEGATES THE SOVIET THREAT

Liaqat Ali Khan saw the growing menace of the Soviet threat. He had been monitoring the expansion of the Russian empire into the six Muslim states, and he had watched the integration of independent Muslim republics into the USSR. He has also seen the forced deportation of the Chechnians and Tartars to Siberia as reprisals for resisting the Sovietization of the Muslim peoples.

Liaqat Ali Khan saw the growing relations of the USSR with Afghanistan as a clear threat to Pakistans sovereignty. Khan went to the US and laid the foundation of a very log term alliance with the USA. This alliance immediately opened up the flood gates of American aid to Pakistan. The initial aid came in the form of German war crime reparation that were given to Pakistan. This put money in the treasury. The next step was UN and Direct USAID to Pakistan. With American protection the existence of Pakistan was guaranteed, or else the nascent nation may have succumbed to the twin USSR-Indian and Sino-Indain threat.

INTERNAL THREAT SUPPRESSED THROUGH STRATEGIC COALITIONS

Jinnah and Khan had generated a cadre of loyal politicians that supported the Muslim League. Liaqat Ali Khan wanted to bank on the traditional allies that both he and Mohammad Ali Jinnah had created across the land of Pakistan. However these were hard to come by because many of the Aligarh led student movement leaders were now back to the grind earning a living. Liaqat Ali Khan was in the process of forming alliances in the Punjab and the NWFP. He trusted the leaders that had supported the Muslim League and he trusted the leaders that had supported Pakistan. Liaqat Ali Khan did not trust the leaders that had opposed Pakistan. Liaqat Ali Khan did not trust the leadership of the Unionist party that was in alliance with the Indian National Congress.

Khan through a series of steps tried to create consensus within the boundaries of Pakistan:

1) Tried to germinate local pro-Muslim leadership in Bengal by supporting the pro-Pakistani Bengali leaders against the pro-Indian and United Bengal nationalist leaders who wanted an independent Bengal.

2) Watched the antics of G.M. Syed whose off again and on again loyalties to the Muslim League and/or Gandhi rendered him un-trusworthy.

3) Tried create Muslim League alliances in two provinces where there was the anti-Muslim League parties playing on the sentiments of the people. Namely it was the Khizar Hyatt led Unionist government in the Punjab and a Ghaffar Khan led government in NWFP.

Liaqat Ali Khan formed the constituent assemby and set upon the task of creting serious structures which would assist the country in the future. All Pakistani constitueions were based on the work of the first constitution. The original 1953 constitution was the basis of the 1973 constituion that is preserved more or less by our courts today.

FORTIES: THE FEUDAL UNIONISTS HAD OPPOSED PAKISTAN AND THE MUSLIM LEAGUE

The Unionist Party had opposed Pakistan, had opposed the Muslim League, had opposed the Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah and had opposed Liaqat Ali Khan. After the death of Jinnah their wrath turned to Khan Liaqat Ali Khan. How could the Unionist oppose a trusted lieutenant of the Quaid? How could they oppose one of the greatest freedom fighters of the struggle for Pakistan? How could the Unionists oppose the leader of the Muslim League—the party that created Pakistan and opposed the Unionists in the Punjab? The Khan had many friends and supporters in the Punjab. The Khan was responsible for creating and nourishing the Muslim League in the Punjab. He had counted on and got the support of the people of Punjab. The Muslim League had defeated the Unionsist in the polls.

Here is a quote from the book “HAD THERE BEEN NO JINNAH” (@1989 by Salahuddin Khan Printed by: PanGraphics (Pvt) Ltd. Islamabad. Pages 14-15.

“From this stage, conflict between the Congress and theMuslim League became increasingly sharp. The MuslimLeague under the skilful leadership of Jinnah set itselfto strengthen its organization, extend its basis of supportamong the Muslim masses, and consolidate the variousMuslim groups and organizations so as to make the Muslim League the main Organization of the Muslims inIndia. During the period 1937-45 a decisive change took placein the position and relative strength of the Muslim League, as it won increasing mass support among the Muslims. The 1946 elections reveal the changed position.In the Central and Provincial Legislative Assembly elections the Muslim League won 460 out of 533 Muslimseats. There can be no doubt, that during this periodthe Muslim League had established its position as the major political organization among Muslims in India. It had been the original aim of the Congress to includeequally Hindus and Muslims. But, in practice, this aimwas never realised in the proportions of membership won.In January 1938, according to a press statement issuedby Nehru, out of 3.1 millions members of Congress, only1,00,000, that is 3.2% were Muslims; overwhelmingmajority of the newly awakened sections of the Muslimsturned to the Muslim League as their political organization.”

The victories in 1946 were at the expense of the pro-Congress Unionists in the Punjab. In the face of very strong popular grass-roots political support for Pakistan, the Muslim League and Liaqat Ali Khan the Hyattis were trying to figure to how to oppose Quaid-e-Azam and the Muslim League. The Khizar Hyatt political machinery could not find anything against Liaqat Ali Khan, so they used the race card. The Khizar Hyatt Unionist Party propaganda had painted Liaqat Ali Khan as an opponent of Punjabis. Nothing could be further from the truth. Liaqat Ali Khan opposed the feudal Unionist leaders like Khizar Hyatt who had opposed Pakistan. Liaqat Ali Khan had many friends in the Punjab who had helped him defeat the Unionists at the polls. It is little known that L.A Khan was born in Karnal East Punjab. Here are some notes on the origins of Liaqat Ali Khan. I quote from p.27 of book by Prof. Ziauddin Ahmad , Liaquat Ali Khan: builder of Pakistan.

“The family, Before settling down in Karnal in thePunjab in the 19th century, lived on the other side of the Jamna in Muzaffarnagar (U.P., India) for some generations, where they owned bigestates. Even after he settled down in Delhi, he took keen interestin the amelioratin and betterment of the Muslims of Muzaffarnagar.”

The Unionist element tried to rally support against Khan Liaqat Ali Khan by playing up the ethnic race card. Liaqat Ali Khan was born in Karnal East Punjab with friends and relatives on both sides of the border. The Khan had very strong ties to East Punjab. However this fact was concealed and many Khizar Hyatt Khan supporters falsly labeled him.

THE ASSASSINATION OF DEMOCRACY IN RAWALPINDI—A CIA PLOT?

Liaqat Ali Khan was killed in broad daylight in Rawalpindi. This is what Zeba Zubair in Mutiny to Mountbatten says about the assassination:

“On 16 October 1951 at a Public Meeting in Rawalpindi, ‘a blind shot from the blue’ silenced the voice of Quaid-e-Millat, Nawabzadah Liaqat Ali Khan. Another epoch of history was at an end. On a sad day for this new nation it was as if a mighty powe in heaven was also reacting in anger at the cowardly act of mankind. The sky of Karachi had a peculiar and ominous orange-yellow colouring and the people felt resltell at the starnge weather…”

This is what the Daily dawn of October 17th, 1951 said:

‘With the kalima on his lips, Liaqat , Successor of the Quaid-e-Azam Prime Minister. Leader unparalleled, is dead. The man who killed him was not just an individual he was the symbol of that deadly enmity of the enemies of Islam who have always wanted to destroy Pakistan. We name only one but we feel this in our heart with the certain flash and convinced truth. We grieve for Liaqat–martyr to Pakistan and Islam; but we proclaim over Liaqat’s still unburied body: Pakistan shall live, and whoever of her servants may fall in her service, this citadel of Islam guarded by 70 million worshippers of Allah will never fall. Begum Liaqat, Ashraf and Akbar, we shall not try to console you in your grief in consolable, but know this, that you beloved husband and father had died in glory and as comes only to the chosen of God. Pakistan Zindabad (Dawn Editorial, 17 October, 1951)”

Even in his last moments he was thinking of his nation. Other then remembering God and reciting the kalima, his last words were “Allah Pakistan ko apni amaan mai~n rakhay “(God save Pakistan). Every Pakistani of that generation absolutely remembers where he was and what he was doing when that fatal shot was announced on Radio Pakistan. Every patriotic Pakistani cried that day.

” A few yards away for the body of the founder of the Pakistan now rests its eternal sleep the body of the builder of Pakistan. Both died in harness and both died for Pakistan. The Quaid-e-Azam worked his body way to waste; the Quaid-e-Millat fearlessly exposed his body to danger for his love of duty and country. The master and the disciple, the twin servants of Islam who in this century added perhaps the most glorious chapter to Islam’s temporal history, now meet heaven. Like twin stars, unseen but their presence always felt, their blessings will be continually showered on the land which the one founded, and the other built up to a state of stability and strength form which progress forward is inevitable because of its own momentum. It is now for the nation which they served so well, to carry on their work, and in particular make the blood of martyred Liaqat blossom to all of us. But upon the new leader who has been chosen by the team left behind by Liaqat the main burned if it will fall, the choice has been will and wisely made..

Khawaja Nazimuddin, our new Prime Minister and Liaqat’s successor as leader of this nation……”(Dawn editorial October 1951)

This is what Javed Jabbar says about the assassination in Rawalpindi in an article in the Nation (Feb 26th, 1997) entitled Accountability: history and truth.

“Distortions in our relationship with accountability have an even more historic dimension. During the lifetime of the Quaid-i-Azam himself, within weeks and months of the creation of Pakistan, reports began to emerge about corruption at high levels in government. One of the major figures who despaired at this early neglect of accountability was Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Then came the assassination of our first Prime Minister Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan. A man who was so financially incorruptible as to leave only a paltry sum in his bank account deserved to have his killers held to account for their heinous crime. Over the past forty-five years, speculative interpretations name prominent individuals as suspects in the Liaquat assassination. The official inquiry was not received as a credible analysis. In addition tothe original stain of financial corruption on the white and spotlessly clean garment of accountabilitywere now added the red stains of blood: people could actually get away with murder.”

The Shaheed-e-Millat was so scrupulously honest that when he died, he had holes in his socks. This was the man that presented the Crescent and Star “Khanjar hilal ka hai qaumi nitaa~n hamaara” to the constituent National Assembly of Pakistan. His famous closed fist remained a symbol of defiance to India, and it remained a symbol of our sovereignity.

Right after the assassination of Khan Liaqat Ali Khan, the patsy—actual murderer (the man who pulled the trigger) was caught and killed immediately (lest he spill the beans). Lee Harvey Oswald suffered the same fate when he actually started talking. However the real murderers the people who ordered the death of a the first prime minister of Pakistan not only remained at large, they actually benefited from his death. As a final insult to the slain freedom-fighter Liaqat Bagh (the site of his assassination) was turned into a bus stop and the promised garden to this date remains a commercial cess pot.

The day Liaqat Ali Khan died , democracy died in Pakistan. Dictators took over the reigns of the government and abrogated the constituent assembly. On 23rd October, Ghulam Mohammad dissilved the Constituent Assembly and with it, any semblence of constitutiona legitmacy. Altaf. This is what the Daily Dawn said in one of its editorials, and it gives a brief synopsis of the events leading to and the levents that occured right after the death of the Shaheed-e-Millat:

“Since birth Pakistan has had four major nights of crisis. On the night of Spetember 11. The Father of the nationdied. On the night of October 16, 1951, the nation held its breath, dazed by the murder of its builder, Liaqat. On the night of April 17, 1953,a Governmetn headed by the President of the Muslim League was flicked off the ash from a cigar-tip. On the night of October 23, 1954 (because it was then, we think that the decision was taken) the constituent Assembly of Pakistan was beleived to be soverign body, was wiped off the country’s political map like one wipes spilt milk form a table….(Dawn: 27 October, 1954)”

This abrogation kept Pakistan without a real constitution till 1973 The 1956 and 1963 constitutions were abrogated and martial laws imposed in 1958 and 1969. A lack of constitutional protection to the Bengalis and other citizens of Pakistan led to the creation of deep suspicions in the minds of the common Pakistanis, specially the Bengalis.

THE BENEFICIARIES FROM LIAQAT ALI KHANS DEATH

It is obvious that the assassins of Khan Liaqat Ali Khan were the parties and leaders who benefited from his death. After remmoving the elected prime minister from office through murder, the feudals tried to marginalize the Bengalis. As a result of the conspiracy the constitution was abrogated and the military feudal complex took over Pakistan. The feudals and their sentries the army took over the reins of the country and never let go.

It is based on these grains of truth that Ayesha Jalal and the Indian text books claim that the Muslim League was supported by the landlords. Before the creation of Pakistan these feudals opposed the Muslim League tooth and nail. It is unfortunate for our country that these feudals became the rulers of Pakistan after Liaqat Ali Khan. The rest as they say is history. For a list of Muslim League enemies, one does not have to go far. A directory of officers of the Unionist Party along with the list of the Khaksars (who actually did make many attempts on Muslim League leaders). For details on the Muslim League-Unionist animosity please see my article called “The Fifth Column” posted on soc.culture.pakistan.history.

This is what Javed Jabbar says about the assassination in Rawalpindi in an article in the Nation (Feb 26th, 1997) entitled Accountability: history and truth.

“When the black gowns of the superior judiciary joined the blood-stained garb of accountability, a decisive turning point was passed. The legitimisation of the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly by Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad and his dismissal of Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin established a new ground norm that went beyond the justified and unavoidable dismissal of Dr Khan Sahib’s NWFP government in August 1948, when the provincial regime declined to accept even the symbolic elements of the new state of Pakistan.”

THE KHAKSARS FASCISTS ATTEMPTED MANY ASSASSINATIONS ON THE QUAID-E-AZAM. DID THE UNIONISTS-KHAKSARS ASASSINATE LIAQAT ALI KHAN?

Vacuity of ideas did not prevent losers from forming parties. There are many inconsequential movements in the Subcontinent, whose mention is but a footnote in the historical records. The Khaksars are but one of the failed movements that achieved nothing. Being proud of the Khaksars is like being proud of the KKK or being proud of the Nazis of German or the Fascists of Italy. The only difference is that the Nazis and the Fascist caught the imagination of the Italians and the Germans. The Khaksars only caught the imagination of the demented few in the Punjab. Their claim to fame was repeated assassination attempts on the Quaid-e-Azam, Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

The fundamentalist militia group calling itself the Khaksars were led by their mouse-hearted salar Agha Zaigham in 1938-40. They got their inspiration from the brown shirts of Italy. They patterned their uniforms and their marching style from Mousolinni and his Fascist Party. They were anarchists who wanted total control over everything.

I quote Stanley Wolpert (Jinnah of Pakistan, Page 180):

” Paramilitary Muslim Khaksars were as hostile towards the Muslim League as they were anti-Hindu and anti-Sikh……..As a whole however, the Khaksars never reconciled to Jinnah’s leadership and tried more than once in the next few years to assassinate him”

The Muslim League led by the Quaid-e-Azam and their march towards Pakistan was an impediment to their fascist dreams. I quote the incident from Jinnah of Pakistan by Stanley Wolpert: Page 224.

“Jinnah returned to Bombay from his tour of Baluchistan on Friday, July 23. Three days later, on the afternoon of Monday, July 26, a fanatical young Muslim Khaksar from Lahore, Rafique Sabir Mazangavi, entered the Quaid-i-Azam’s Mount Pleasant Road house and appealed to Jinnah’s secretary, Mr. M.H.Saiyed for an interview with the great leader. Just then Jinnah entered his secretary’s office and asken who Tafiq was and what he wanted ‘I was very busy’, Jinnah testified later in Bombay’s high court. My whole mind was on my correspondence and I was trying to get out of the room. Just as I was about to leave the room, in the twinkling of an eye, the accused sprang on me and gave me a blow with his clenched fist on my left jaw. I naturally reeled back a bit when he pulled out a knife from his wrist….It was an open knife….Instinct of self-defence made me put out my hand and catch his wrist, with the result that the momentum of the blow was broken but in spite of this the knife touched the left side of my jaw. I got a cut near my chin and my coat near the left-shoulder…I also got a wound on my left finger.

The last meeting of the All India Muslim League was held on June 10, 1947…..Here is another incident narrated by Wolpert in Jinnah of Pakistan on Page 329:

“Khaksars rushed in through the once-tranquil garden, entering the hotel lounge ‘brandishing belchas, or sharpened spades…shouting get Jinnah!’ half way up the staircase leading to the ballroom where Jinnah and the Council were ….in session before…League National Guards could grapple with them and turn them back. It took police with tear gas to bring the disturbance to an end. Some fifty Khaksar would-be assassins were arrested….

The movement ended without achieving any results. The Muslim League routed them at the polls and eliminated their attempts at arson and carnage. Their assassination attempts on the Quaid-e-Azam were unsuccessful. Liaqat Ali Khan however did get asassinated.

CRITICISM OF KHAN LIAQAT ALI KHAN

No Pakistani leader can be put on a pedastal and worshipped. Liaqat Ali Khan was a politician, and he faced the political wrath of his opponents. The purpose of persenting his criticism is to learn from history. Could he have formed better alliances with the Unitionists? Could he have curried favor with the Hyatts? Could he have practised more inclusion? Could he have have created more consensus politics? The answer to all the questions is yes. But he lived under enormous pressure. He was a freedom fighter. He was unable to enjoy the fruits of his victories like Fidel Castro. He was unlucky for he did not have the life of Boumediene who was able to lead Algeria to victory, and then was able to give stability and direction to the new nation. Like the Indonesian Sukarno, Liaqat did not survive to enjoy his victories. Like Hazrat Usman, Liaqat Ali Khan faced the charge of nepotism, and like Usman, he too was murdered by his opponents. If a man is known by the stature of his opponents, then Liaqat Ali Khan indeed was a great man.

The Khan was brutally honest, and he was a patriot till his last breath. He had no bank accounts and he built no empires for himself. After his death, his wife Rana Liaqat Ali Khan, had to work as government servant to support the family till she died. The ahtishab commission would have absolved him, for he was never charged with any personal crime of corruption. His struggle with the feudals was the struggle for Pakistan. Sahukat Hyatt has criticized the Quaid and the Muslim League in his ‘memoirs”. Hyatts agenda is clear. Demonize the Khan and demonize Jinnah. Rock the foundations of the leadership of the Muslim League and this will crumble the history on which the country stands. The opponents point of view has to be understood and rebutted. Here is the criticism of the Khan by his greatest enemy.

Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan, the last of the prominent Muslim League leaders, has this to say in his Memoirs, “The nationa that lost its soul”, p. 178.

“He (Liaqat Ali Khan) delayed the completion of the Constitution to avoid elections which he could not win because he had no seat in Pakistan and had to be elected by East Pakistan. He, on the advice of officers belonging to the United Provinces, broke the Liaqat-Nehru Pact about the agreed areas for migration from India to Pakistan, requiring the record of property to be exchanged officially. He, quite against the agreement permitted inhabitants of UP and Rajasthan to enter via Khokhrapar – thus opening floodgates endangering the stability of the already overloaded boat of Pakistan. I objected to this in the assembly. This action of Liaqat was quite partial allowing only people from his old Province and the adjoining areas to migrate unfairly into Pakistan in rder to create a seat for himself in Karachi. The people of the rest of the India were left to stew in their own juice. This act of his created a lot of confusion with people getting allotments in Sindh, without records on each other’s dubious evidence. This led to the problems of MQM and their hatred by Sindhis. These refugees got a monopoly of jobs in the cities and deprived local Pakistanis of their rightful share. The political instability still persists.”(source: Page 178 from the “Nation that lost its soul”, enclosed as Vol 2.5 in the document)

Unable to find any flaws with the character and strategy of the freedom fighting Khan, Hyatt uses the race card to discredit the Shaeed-e-Millat. The above criticism of the Khan is invalid due to the following reasons:

1. In 1947 Forty percent of Pakistan was Hindu and Sikh, and more than 60% of Lahore was Hindu and Sikh. If Pakistan had remained a state with these population ratios, the vialbility of the fledgling state was at stake. A Pakistani nation with 40% Hindus and Sikh could hardly be called Islamic and could hardly have any laws that would allow the propogation of Islam.
2. The bulk of migration into Pakistan occured across the Punjab border and involved the Muslim Panjabis headed West to West Punjab, and the Hindu and Sikh Punjabis headed East to East Punjab (and Haryana). Lahore, Rawalpindi, Sargodha and Sialkot and other major cities of the Punjab were actually all Hindu or Hindu dominated cities.
3. Most of the Muslim migration was not into Sindh and it was not out of the UP. In the period right after independence, five Million East Punjabis were exchanged with five million West Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs. About 1.5 million Kashmiris migrated to Lahore. The families of Muslim Leaguers like Nawaz Sharif are progenies of that Kashmiri Muslim migration.
4. The Nehru-Liaqat pact was not adhered to. The Nehru-Liaqat pact died the day, India refused the transfer of the assets to the government of Pakistan–planes, cars, chairs, gold and bullion. It also died the day, Patel sent his police action into Hydrabad. It died the day Junagarh was denied its right to accede to Pakistan. It died long before Hari Singh acceeded to India.
5. 5) Gurdspur was a Muslim majority area in East Punjab. Gurdaspur was in the natural line of demarcation to be in Pakistan. It was on the Pakistani side of the river. The Radcliff commission gave away Gurdaspur to India because it provided an Indian road link to Kashmir. Gurdaspur had Pakistani flags fluttering everwhere. It was given to India. Read Minto to see the details of the massacre and the rape Muslims in Gurdaspur. The majority of the Muslim majority Punjabi inhabitants were now set on the “Pakistan specials” bound for Lahore and Pakistan. The same story went on in many many town and villages. For details please see Collins (Freedom at Midnight). The Nehru-Liaqat pact faced these types of human tragedies.
6. The Hyatt criticism fails to mention the alliances Liaqat Ali Khan had with many other non-Unioninst, iddependent andMuslim League Punjabi leaders. Liaqat Ali Khan founded the Punjab Muslim League, nurtured it and used it to defeat the Unionists. The League struggle against the Congress allied with the Unionists is not mentioned by the Hyatt memoirs. The Khan and the League were popular in the Punjab, he had electoral victories in the Punjab to prove this fact. The creation of Pakistan was indeed possible because the Congress-Unionist alliance was defeated in the Punjab.
7. The Khan formed alliances and chose pro-Pakistani elements. It is obvious that he did not promote the likes of Hyatt because he did not want pro-Congress sympathizers in his government. Many/most of the early Muslim Leagers from the Punjabwere the allies of the Khan. These very leaders formed the intelligencia of the Punjab and Pakistan today.
8. The instability in Sindh is a complex issue created by many mistakes. Some of these mistakes are bing rectified by the PML-MQM government in power.
9. The battles in the streets of Karachi are ethnic and religious in nature, all conflicts have that element, but the main cause of friction is Karachi and Urban Sindh is ECONOMIC. To brand the problems as ethnic is dismissing a phenomenon that has to do with the evolution of South Asian society.

Here is a more credible historian who paints us a realistic picture of the events of Pakistani freedom. The book is “HAD THERE BEEN NO JINNAH” (@1989 by Salahuddin Khan Printed by: PanGraphics (Pvt) Ltd. Islamabad.pages 14-15

In a letter to Jinnah, in January 1937, Nehru declared,

“In the final analysis, there are only two forces in Indiatoday- British Imperialism, and the Congress representing Indian Nationalism, the Muslim Leaguerepresents a group of Muslims, having no contact withthe Muslim masses.”

This statement was indeed a great victory for the League for Jinnah and for Liaqat Ali Khan. It defeated the Unionist-Congress alliance in the Punjab and the Badsha Khan-Congress alliance in Sarhad. Both alliances would have defeated Pakistan if allowed to flourish.

I quote from Reference which is very anti-Liaqat, but this gives us a very deep insight into the politics of the time:

“Punjabi chauvinism and Liaqat Ali Khan’s favoritism was at each others throat. The fight was furious and Mr. Khan was not a gentleman either. Mr. Khan was desperate to build his political base in the newly formed state. He could go to any length to achieve his personal goals” .

Political History of Pakistan, Vol. 4, edited by Hasan Jafar Zaidi, Idara-Mutala-i-Tarikh. pp 185-187

Liqat Ali Khan was a philanthropist, who took keen interest in developing the Muslims of East Punjab the place of his birth. He supported many instituions in Karnal and assisted as many Muslims as he could. Details of his philanthropy are clearly listed in Professor Ziauddin’s book Liaqat Ali Khan: Builder of Pakistan. He chose the old Muslim Leaguers who had supported the Quaid and had fought for Pakistan. It did not matter where the supporters originated—–the test was loyalty to Pakistan.

Charging Liaqat Ali Khan with nepotism, and commenting on the appointments Liaqat Ali Khan had made, here is another quote from the Political History of Pakistan:

Hashim Raza, administrator Karachi; his brother Kazim Raza, IG police; Aal-e-Raza, also brother of Hashim, Public Prosecutor; Superintendent CID; Home Secretary Punjab, all of them from UP. Liaqat Ali Khan did all this to secure his political success from Karachi at least.

Here is Hasan Jafar Zaidi defending Liaqat Ali Khan:

It doesn’t mean that Punjab was being suppressed. The then chief secretary East Bengal, Aziz Ahmad was from Punjab. The commander of army in Bengal was (you guessed it right) Maj. General Ayub Khan was from Hazar…. They never gave the respect to political leadership of Bengal either.

This incorrect sentiment against Liaqat Ali Khan (planted by the antagonist of the Muslim League, the great feudal Mr. Khizar Hyatt and the pro-Congress, and anti-Pakistan, Unionist Party ) has been uprooted in our historical records and died in the feudal stronghold of Rawalpindi and the Potowar region (the Hyatt-Tiwans stronghold). After the creation of Pakistan the pro-Congress/Gandhi Unionist Party of Punjab went extinct but the remnants of the old political guard still oppose the Muslim League or what it stood for. Shaheed-e-Millats anniversary cannot be ignored. It is the anniversary of the victory for Pakistan. Liaqat Ali Khan has been given his rightful place in history. The ablest lieutenants of the Quaid has his place next to the the Quaid. The nation calls him shahed-e-millat. Pakistani patriots call him shaheed-e-millat. If Quaid-e- Azam was the founder of nation, Quaid-e-Millat, Liaqat Ali Khan was the builder of the state.

Preservation of our history is our sacred duty. This site would be a very boring place without the interactive dialogue and the criticism of our leadershsip. Criticism of our leaders is an essential part of the dialogue. More criticism of the Khan and of the Muslim League will be rebutted in the columns.

THE END

APPEENDIX A

Recently declassified doucments regarding Liaqat Ali Khan’s assassination

return to Paul Wolf’s home page

Pakistan: Partition and Military Succession

Documents from the U.S. National Archives

POLITICAL INTRIGUE

Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan
Ghulam Mohammed
Iskander Mirza
April 1953 Coup
Constititional Coup of September 21, 1954
Mohammed Ayub Khan
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Jamaat-e-Islami
Muslim Brotherhood
Matta Riot
Anti-Communist Program in East Pakistan
misc political

Assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan

G-2 BID Report No. R-91-48, June 15, 1948

Subjects Touched on by Liaquat Ali Khan in Speeches During His Tour of Western Pakistan, Oct. 5, 1948

Congen Lahore reports Liaquat shot this afternoon while attending meeting of Muslim City League at Rawalpindi. Operated on due two shots in chest. Hospital reports wound serious but not rpt not necessarily fatal. Assailant killed by crowd not rpt not yet identified. Information not rpt not yet confirmed by GOP Karachi. Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embasssy, Oct. 16, 1951

Prime Minister killed at Rawalpindi by Islam League fanatic. No rpt no internal disturbances reported. … Embassy informed Cabinet meeting tomorrow to be presided over by Governor Gen. who will probably step down as GG and take over temporarily as PM. Reference EmbDesp 409 October 4. Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Oct. 16, 1951

Although popular information attributes assassination to Khaksars, high authority in Government informs Embassy that killer Syed Akhbar, was an Afghan national and was motivated by (1) Pukhtoonistan sentiment and anger over political detention of his brother and (2) resentment over Pak Govts cautious attitude toward Kashmir. Killer had participated in Kashmir war. Source says connection with Pukhtoonistan will not rpt not be released to press. Killer left his home in Abbotabad for Rawalpindi on 14th. Emergency meeting of available Cabinet Ministers with Secy Gen Mohamed Ali presiding just concluded. No rpt no indication successor; decision probably not rpt not made. Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embasssy, Oct. 16, 1951

Government press information department is now telling press that assassin was Afghan national. Press information officer now says identity established as member of Jagran tribe. Present state of public opinion indicates strong possibility of public demand for war if this information accepted by public. Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embasssy, Oct. 17, 1951

The Situation in Pakistan, Oct. 17, 1951

Comment on the Assassination of the Pakistani Prime Minister, Oct. 17, 1951

The Assassination of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Oct. 18, 1951

Special Note: The Assassination of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Oct. 18, 1951 (11 pages; William Langer’s name appears on report)

I have just talked with Ghulam Mohd who asked me to send you his affectionate greetings. He said he is bearing up very well under shock of Liaquat’s death and necessity for taking immediate decisions that have resulted in his appointment and Nazimuddin’s Premiership. They are being sworn in tomorrow afternoon at four. Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embasssy, Oct. 18, 1951

This p.m. I had tea with Ghulam Mohammed following his arrival from Rawalpindi by train. He stood journey without undue fatigue and his convalescence does not appear to have been retarded by shocks of last 2 days. He will take oath of office as Governor General tomorrow at 4 p.m. and will immediately swear in Nazimuddin as PM. Announcement of new Cabinet will not be made immediately. Liaquat’s cabinet will continue in their various port-folios for time being. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Oct. 18, 1951

The Pakistan government has identified the assassin of Liaquat Ali Khan, late Prime Minister of Pakistan, as being Sayed Akber, son of Babrak Khan. If that assertion is true, the above mentioned Sayed Akber, together with his brother, [Za]marak, insurged against the government of Afghanistan in 1944 at a place named Elmara in Jadran, situated in the southern province of Afghanistan. The government forces defeated the insurrection and the two brothers escaped. After wandering for some time, they surrendered themselves to the British frontier authorities who interned them in Abot Abad, and granted them regular salaries. After the partition of India, the said Sayed Akber was given asylum by the Pakistan government. It is clear, therefore, that the said Sayed Akber had no connection whatsoever with Afghanistan, which looks upon such activities with great indignation. Official Afghan Reaction to Press Implications of Afghan Complicity in Assassination of Pakistan Prime Minister, Oct. 18, 1951

Iskander Mirza Defense Secretary called on me yesterday morning before cabinet meeting and asked my advice regarding Pak Govt attitude on publicity as to Afghan nationality of Primins assassin, money found in his possession, etc. I asked if facts were true and he said they were. I said that further publicity on this line would have bad effect on popular mind and he apparently agreed. Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embasssy, Oct. 19, 1951

Reliable source in Pak Intelligence Bureau reports that Pak Govt has been aware intelligence activities of Afghan Consul in Peshawar for some time and that he is known to have had recent and frequent contacts with Syed Akhbar, Assassin of Primin. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embasssy, Oct. 19, 1951

Press reaction including Bengali to assassination Liaquat Ali Khan: papers repeat GOI official’s remarks and expand expressions sympathy and condemnation of violence in editorials. Moderation is keynote throughout with exception extreme leftist press including Communist “Swadhinata” which states “Liaquat’s death only reflects inevidable disaster that overtakes policy of playing lackey to Anglo-American Powers,” also accuses Nazimuddin of “Western bias” and of planning prevention improvement position Suhrawardy. … Speculation in Calcutta tends emphasize probability assassination resulted same group (military) whose planned coup March 1951 nipped by GOP. Sources think military extremists hands strengthened. Restricted Telegram from Consulate General, Calcutta, Oct. 19, 1951

Afghan Charge handed Department October 18 translated communique from Kabul for local press, stating in summary if GOP identification Liaquat’s assassin Syed Akhbar as Afghan national correct, it was clear Akhbar and brother involved in unsuccessful insurrection against GOA 1944 southern province following which they interned India. Communique indicated GOA revulsion assassination. … Embassy Kabul should seek occasion soonest convey substance above remarks Foreign Office. While Department recognizes necessity Afghan pronouncement in answer implications press reports, believes best interest both countries served by limiting public discussion. Request earliest transmission fullest information and Embassy comments re alleged 1944 insurrection and possibility Commie instigation assassination. Secret Telegram from Secretary of State, Oct. 20, 1951

[] reports Afghan Consul Peshawar presently in Kabul. This confirmed by British Embassy clerk who when on October 16 asked for transport in Egyptian Embassy vehicle from Peshawar to Kabul was told seat was unavailable because Afghan Consul had been promised transport to Kabul. Embassy feels Afghan Consul’s departure not rpt not necessarily connected with assassination as no rpt no information established connection available this time. Afghan press today admits Liaquat assassin may have been one Syed Akbar from Khost Province in Afghan but stated that he and brother Zamarak had fled to South Waziristan in 1945 after inciting unsuccessful rebellion and were later resettled in Abbotabad and given pensions by British thus losing Afghan nationality. Consequently, press maintains Afghan cannot rpt not be held in any way responsible. Other source states assassin and two brothers (one named Izmair) were members leading family Hjadran tribe in Khost Province and fled to South Waziristan when tribe was defeated in 1945 uprising against Khost Provincial Government. Also states assassin was member “Red Shirt” organization but affiliation two surviving brothers, now residing Pakistan, unknown. Secret Telegram from Kabul Embassy, Oct. 21, 1951

It seems generally accepted in [Rawalpindi and Peshawar] that Afghan Consul was paymaster of assassin PAK PRIMIN. According to one story Consul made trip to Afghan frontier in own car and upon arrival paid off his Pak chauffeur. Chauffeur allegedly had no previous knowledge of trip or fact he was to be dismissed and on return Peshawar spole of matter to friends and to Pak Intelligence. In conversations with various non-official persons, including Pashtuns, it was stated as self-evident fact that Pashtuns as group have always provided assassins for suitable price. Pashtun racial background of assassin SEYED AKBAR was accepted as wholly natural. Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embasssy, Oct. 22, 1951

The Current Outlook in Pakistan, Oct. 22, 1951

In accordance GOP request Pakistan Press has refrained since October 19 from referring to Afghan connections of assassin. Government has not released to public information that assassin was in contact with Afghan Consul at Peshawar. GOP has no information indicating any commie connection with assassination. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embasssy, Oct. 23, 1951

Secret Telegram from Kabul Embassy, Oct. 23, 1951

Embassy today received Circular from Afghan Embassy containing following remarks: Assassin said Akhbar and brother revolted against Afghan government 1944. After defeat rebellion they fled over border and finally gave up selves to British authorities. For some unknown reason British gave them shelter in Abbottabad, center of Hazara district, and also gave them money to live on. After division Pakistan and India, Pakistan government, unconcerned about international law or acknowledged neighborly behavior, have been investigating against government of Afghanistan and, among other activities, have sought services of this assassin. His late crime proves that assassin was not only enemy of present regime Afghanistan but, through some other mysterious machinations in Pakistan itself, he also became enemy of Pakistan government. Government and people Afghanistan who could have possibly no connection with assassin look upon such base and mean crime with abhorrence and disdain. Secret Telegram from Moscow Embassy, Oct. 26, 1951

Under headline reading “Is Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination result of a deep-laid American conspiracy?”, leftist Urdu daily Bhopal named Nadeem published article October 24 charging US with responsibility. Summary article follows:

[...]It was learned within Pakistani Foreign Office that while UK pressing Pakistan for support re Iran, US demanded Pakistan exploit influence with Iran and support Iran transfer oil fields to US. Liaquat declined request. US threatened annul secret pact re Kashmir. Liaquat replied Pakistan had annexed half Kashmir without American support and would be able to take other half. Liaquat also asked US evacuate air bases under pact. Liaquat demand was bombshell in Washington. American rulers who had been dreaming conquering Soviet Russia from Pakistan air bases were flabbergasted. American minds set thinking re plot assassinate Liaquat. US wanted Muslim assassin to obviate international complications. US could not find traitor in Pakistan as had been managed Iran, Iraq, Jordan. Washington rulers sounded US Embassy Kabul. American Embassy contacted Pashtoonistan leaders, observing Liaquat their only hurdle; assured them if some of them could kill Liaquat, US would undertake establish Pashtoonistan by 1952. Pashtoon leaders induced Akbar undertake job and also made arrangements kill him to conceal conspiracy. USG-Liaquat differences recently revealed by Graham report to SC; Graham had suddenly opposed Pakistan although he had never given such indication. [...] Cartridges recovered from Liaquat body were American-made, especially for use high-ranking American officers, usually not available in market. All these factors prove real culprit behind assassin is US Government, which committed similar acts in mid-East. “Snakes” of Washington’s dollar imperialism adopted these mean tactics long time ago. Confidential Telegram No. 1532 from New Delhi Embassy, Oct. 30, 1951

Recommend Department ignore article summarized in Delhi’s 1532. It is compilation of utter falsehoods whose vituperation is some degree worse than articles that appear from time to time in Bombay’s Commie-line “Blitz”. To issue any statement labeling the facts in the article as lies will only give Nadeem an importance it does not merit. The investigation into background of Liaquat’s assassination is being conducted with extreme care and well guarded secrecy. Gurmani tells me an intercept has been obtained which if backed up by further material may reveal the assassination had some inspiration and followed the pattern of Razmara’s assassination in Teheran. Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embasssy, Oct. 31, 1951

Since article apparently not rpt not widely circulated, Department believes preferable not rpt not issue public denial. In its discretion, however, Embassy might informally mention case MEA with comment story so preposterous no rpt no public denial intended. Would be interesting to know whether this story of character which led adoption recent press law. Ownership management NADEEM should be discreetly be investigated. Confidential Telegram from State Dept., Nov. 1, 1951

Soviet Press today carried Prague Despatch reporting Rude Pravo article based Afghan press agency “Bahtar” information re assassination Liaquat Ali. Despatch states after escaping Afghanistan due murders and other crimes “Said Akbar ran to India and there under protection British authorities which gave him refuge in Abbotabad and provided him money. After partition India Akbar remained in Pakistan where he continued make use protection of certain British circles.” “These facts adduced by Afghan press supporting position that murder Liaquat Ali was result intrigue of imperialists in Asian countries.” Secret Telegram from Moscow Embassy, Nov. 3, 1951 [only first page located]

The Embassy questions the premise stated in the first sentence of the Airgram under reference (“Lack of spontaneous anti-Indian and anti-Afghan popular outburst over both July war scare and Liaquat’s assassination suggests feeling on Kashmir and Afghan disputes mostly government inspired.”) … The anti-Afghan agigation that spontaneously sprang up on October 16-17 was effectively stopped by the GOP’s prompt exercise of its official and unofficial powers of censorship over the press, even to the extent of preventing reference after October 17 to the assassin’s Afghan origin. Popular Feeling in Pakistan on Kashmir and Afghan Issues, Nov. 10, 1951

With regard to the assassination of the Prime Minister in Rawalpindi, Colonel Massart stated that he had not attended the meeting because of his UN position. He stated that part of the public reaction was a great surprise to him, since he found some of the non-commissioned officers nto expressing horror, but making remarks, “He should have known better to come to Rawalpindi, where he should have known that he would be shot.” The Colonel considers that Rawalpindi was a center of “anti-Liaquat feeling.” Confidential Telegram from Lahore Consulate, Nov. 14, 1951

Acting Foreign Minister Hussain informed me tonight in conversation called at his request that Paks had recd information over past two-three weeks that Afghan authorities rpt Afghan authorities had recently surreptitiously released from incarceration over 120 known killers with orders infiltrate Pak and eliminate Pak public men. At first Paks did not believe but Hussain states that information has now reached Paks causing them consider reports beyond doubt. He would not reveal sources of latter information beyond admitting that some came from Pak Embassy Kabul but with most from many other sources. Added that if other public men assassinated by suspected Afghan nationals government will be unable hold people in check. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Nov. 15, 1951

Liaquat Ali Khan was buried in the same manner (tomb) as Jinnah. In order to accomplish this, a wall behind Jinnah’s grave was torn down and access to the grave for the funeral procession was across a raised marble floor surrounding Jinnah’s mazar to Liaquat’s grave in the rear. This has continued to be the primary avenue to the grave of Liaquat used by the many mourners who still visit there every day. It is reliably reported, however, that Fatima Jinnah ordered the caretaker of Quaid-i-Azam’s mazar to rebuild the wall. She later repeated the request to the Secretary of the Ministry of Works. The matter was put before the Minister and on the same day orders were given to raise up the wall again. However, shortly afterwards the new wall was torn down by what was variously described in the press as a “bevy of All-Pakistan Women’s Association amazons” to a “mob from Quaiddbad.” M.A. Zuberi, Editor of the Evening Star told an officer of the Embassy that, in fact, two officers of the All-Pakistan Women’s Association, of which Begum Liaquat Ali Khan is President, incited a group of people at the mazar to tear down the wall. Public Role of Ms. Fatima Jinnah Since Assassination of Liaquat, Nov. 17, 1951

The Commission inquiring into the security precautions taken at time of Liaquat’s assassination reconvened Lahore Jan. 3. Among witnesses examined since convening are Khan Najaf Khan, Special Police, and Anwar Ali, Deputy Inspector General of Police, CIA (in “camera”). No conclusive findings made or announced thus far. Political and Economic Developments for the Week Ending Jan. 8, 1952, Jan. 8, 1952

Political Developments in Pakistan, Sept.-Dec. 1951, Jan. 30, 1952

The most significant internal development during the quarter, bearing on US interests and objectives, was Liaquat’s assassination. Aside from being an avowed friend of the US, Liaquat was a constructive factor of decision and strength, both in government and party leadership. … It seems clear that Prime Minister Nazimuddin, though basically friendly to the West, lacks the stubborn firmness that served Liaquat, the Muslim League and the country as a whole in its early formative years. Confidential Telegram A-251 from Karachi Embassy, Feb. 11, 1952

Political Developments in Pakistan, January 1952, Feb. 25, 1952

Summary of report Liaquat assassination enquiry commission, released by GOP yesterday, being sent in clear Embtel following. Emb believes commission report which is vague and inconclusive leaves cabinet in more vulnerable position than before enquiry started. Motive not established, according to released summary, and GOP now wide open to accusations by its critics of suppression of info and of not satisfying public demand, accusationswhich were made before release. It seems possible that summary is much watered-down version of full report in hands of GOP and that full facts will not be made public. Cabinet particularly vulnerable on enquiry commission’s announcement that info would not be divulged on three conspiracies uncovered. Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Aug. 18, 1952

Siddiq Wahab, one of speakers at public meeting August 14 addressed by Larachi Muslim League dissidents, arrested by police Aug 18 for “promoting hatred against Govt.” Emb local employees who attended meeting state that in addition to demanding publication Liaquat assassination enquiry report Wahab accused Nazimuddin and some of his cabinet of complicity in Liaquat assassination. Wahab is a director of large Karachi Urdu daily Anjam. Begum Liaquat in statement issued to press Aug 18 has strongly criticized published enquiry report. She stated “anybody reading report will be impressed particularly by wise reserve with which Commission left open the all important qusetion … that is, whether or not act of assassin was individiaul act of Said Akbar or perpetrated by him in pursuance of conspiracy,” and added “it is for nation now they have seen report to judge for themselves whether they satisfied with steps so far taken to track down hidden hand behind tragedy.” Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Aug. 19, 1952

Speculation is wide that the assassination was part of a conspiracy involving persons high in provincial or Central Govt. Khan Najaf Khan seems to be the convenient scapegoat. In fact careful reading of report shows there was negligent handling of security measures all down the line and at the inquiry both the Punjab Govt. and the North West Frontier Province Govt. seemed far more interested in passing the blame to each other and in covering up for their own officials than in getting at the truth. NWFP is involved because the assassin was under local detention in Abbotabad, NWFP, and was not supposed to make a move without police permission. Political and Economic Developments for the Week Aug 17-23, Aug. 25, 1952

Sudden death in air crash of GOP Inspector General of Police brought forth revelation that he was to be officially assigned to case. Press sources claimed he was already secretly working on it. H.S. Suhrawardy, head of opposition Junnah Awami League called on GOP to compel Punjab Government to do its duty in getting to the bottom of the assassination conspiracy. Political and Economic Summary for Week Aug. 24-29, 1952, Aug. 30, 1952

The Inquiry Committee investigating the recent plane crash in which GOP Inspector General of Police was killed has revealed that all the principal documents relating to the Liaquat assassination investigation were on the plane and had been received safely. It is believed here by some that this is another link in the chain of suspicious events surrounding the assassination. Had the plane burned on crashing, as tehre was good reason to expect, all the documents would have conveniently disappeared and the investigation would have practically come to an end. This of course has served to increase the rumors that high officials are implicated in the assassination and are making every effort to prevent an honest and efficient investigation. Political and Economic Summary for Week August 30 – September 5, 1952, Sept. 9, 1952

The release of the report which hinted at dark conspiracies and accused several police officials of derelication of duty in failing to take proper security precautions, opened the dam for a flood of rumors, suppositions and speculations. The most popularly accepted theory was that the assassination was the result of a conspiracy in which high officials were involved and that efforts had been, and were being made, to suppress an impartial and thorough inquiry. The Inquiry Commission was appointed by the Punjab government and much criticism was heaped on its head as a result of the report. Many demands were made for the Central Government to take up the investigation. Soon after the report was published, the Inspector General of Police of Pakistan was killed in a freak air crash. In the plane wreckage were found all the documents pertaining to the investigation. It thus leaked out that the central government had in fact been working on the case through a few days earlier the Prime Minister had stated that it was a purely provincial matter. The rumor factories at once linked the air crash with alleged attempts at suppression of evidence and concluded that it was all part of a well laid plan. However, after a few days of sensational reporting of the case the press did a black out and popular curiosity seems to have died down. Bi-Monthly Political Report – July and August, 1952, Sept. 12, 1952

Khan Najaf Khan, Police Official accused of negligence in failing to take proper security precautions for the safety of Liaquat has reportedly answered the charge sheet served on him. The burden of his answer is not yet revealed but it is assumed by all he will plead not guilty to the charges. Begum Liaquat has again charged that the government is dragging its feet in pressing the investigation of the assassination. COMMENT: It is widely rumored here that the charges against Najaf Khan are merely a cover for the parties really responsible for the assassination. Bazaar rumors are to the effect that he will be temporarily suspended but taken care of either financially or otherwise. Begum Liaquat has not failed to point out the inconsistency of the claim made by the GOP Prime Minister that the investigation was a purely provincial matter with the later revelation that the GOP Inspector General of Police was investigating the matter on behalf of the Central Govt and was conveniently killed in a recent plane crash. It has also been stated soto voce that the true instigators of the assassination are the same persons behind the Rawalpindi conspiracy to overthrow the government. A connection of some sort was hinted at in the official report of the assassination investigation. The link, it is rumored, lies in the fact that Liaquat was insisting on the death penalty for the conspirators and it was therefore necessary to eliminate him. Whether this connection is true or not, it is a fact that after Liaquat’s death the charges against the conspirators seem to have reached a stalemate and there are recent consistent reports of their impending release. ConGen officer was told by Finlay’s representative in Lahore that his company had received a letter signed by “ex-Major General Akbar Khan, Hyderabad Central Jail” inquiring as to prices of tractors and other agricultural equipment and stating that the writer expected to engage in large scale cultivation “within six months.” General Akbar Khan was the ringleader of the Rawalpindi conspiracy, and this communication if true would seem to indicate that at least the chief protagonist expects to be released in the near future. Political and Economic Summary, September 29-October 6, 1952, Oct. 6, 1952

Unnamed spokesman for GOP answered Begum Liaquat’s charges that investigation not pursued as actively as possible. He explained position of central govt. vis a vis provincial govt as being limited by Constitution to that of providing coordination and advice, but repeated that Law and Order are provincial subjects under Constitution. Punjab govt appointed Justice Abu Akram of the Federal Court of Pak to inquire into charges proferred against Khan Najaf Khan, police official accused of negligence in assassination. Weekly Political and Economic Summary, Oct. 6-12, 1952, Oct. 13, 1952

The formal inquiry before Mr. Justice Abu Saleh Mohammed Akram of the Federal Court, against Khan Najaf Khan, police official accused of negligence, started this week. It is being held in camera. Comment: It should be noted that a Federal court judge has been selected to conduct the inquiry in order to avoid the charges of provincialism which were levelled at the Assassination Commission itself. Nevertheless confidential reports reaching ConGen are to the effect that the present inquiry will be a whitewash and that Justice Akram is under the influence of Chief Min. Daultana and was selected for this very reason. Weekly Summary of Political and Economic Events, Oct. 20-26, 1952, Oct. 27, 1952

An unconfirmed news item appearing in the local press stated that the Punjab Govt is considering taking action against Khan Najaf Khan, Police Official, who has been accused of negligence in the Liaquat Assassination Commission Report. … According to the report if Mr. Najaf Khan is found to have been guilty of negligence he may appeal his case to the Central Govt as he in fact belongs to the Pak Police Service and is only on loan to the Punjab. Weekly Summary of Political and Economic Events, 18-25 January 1953, Jan. 26, 1953

The Punjab police have completed the inquiry into the assassiantion of the late Prime Minister, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, and now the scene of inquiry has been shifted to the Frontier Province where the Inquiry Board consisting of Director of the Intelligence Bureau and the Inspector-General of police of the Punjab and the Frontier, will continue further investigations. Weekly Summary of Political and Economic Events, Feb 23-3/1, 1953, March 2, 1953

According to a press report Khan Najaf Khan has been exonerated by the Pakistan Public Service Commission. At the time of Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination Najaf Khan was Senior Superintendent of Police at Rawalpindi and was also acting as the Deputy Inspector-General of Police in that area. Mr. Justice Abu Saleh Mohammad Akram, a Judge of the Federal Court, had conducted an inquiry against Khan Najaf Khan in connection with Liaquat Ali’s murder. Weekly Summary of Political and Economic Events, June 18-24, 1953, June 25, 1953

The agitation to force the Government to publish the report of the commission investigating former Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination and to induce the Government to adopt more stringent measures to apprehend the guilty parties was continued during the reporting period. A DAWN suggestion that Scotland Yard be called in to solve the murder elicited strong pro and con feelings. Weekly Summary of Political Developments for the Week Ending October 30, 1953, Oct. 31, 1953

With considerable emotion, Begum Liaquat spoke about the assassination of her husband, the late Prime Minister. She said it was fantastic that two years after a murder in broad daylight before thousands of peopel, not one arrest had been made. What harm could come from a thorough investigation? Witnesses had not been questioned, no real attempt at investigation had been made, and yet when a demand for this was made, the Government not only refused but “hired” the editor of a paper who himself had been in jail under a previous Cabinet (Suleri of the Times of Karachi) to campaign against Dawn and the people demanding an investigation. Memorandum of Conversation with Begum Liaquat Ali Khan, Nov. 21, 1953

No, repeat no, objection Prime Minister announcing he intends request US aid in obtaining services private, repeat private, investigator. You should make clear to Prime Minister this assent does not guarantee success in finding satisfactory person in US and that US Government participation would extend only to informal aid in search for investigator as it has offered such aid to Pakistan on previous occasions for technical experts. Secret Telegram from State Dept., Dec. 29, 1953

Nur Ahmed … urged that the appointment of a “foreign expert” to investigate the murder of Liaquat Ali Khan be made before October 16, the anniversary of Liaquat’s death. Nogum Nahie [?], Karachi Municipal Councillor, whose press statements, like those of Nur Ahmed, appear with rather astonishing frequency, asked on October 5th why the promised “foreign expert” had not appeared. “The Prime Minister’s broadcasts say nothing about the matter nearest to every Pakistani’s heart. Maybe foreign detectives are here and are at work.” Summary of Political Events for Week Ending October 8, 1954, Oct. 9, 1954

Anniversary of the death of Liaquat Ali Khan - Begum Liaquat Ali Khan, newly appointed Ambassador to the Netherlands and widow of the former Prime Minister, assassinated on October 16, 1951, issued a 500 word statement from the Hague calling for a solution to the crime and asking six leading questions: 1) “Why” was Liaquat murdered at the height of his popularity, “on the eve of … important policy decisions”; 2) “Why” was the assassin shot after he had already been overpowered; 3) “Why” was the police official responsible (for shooting the assassin) promoted instead of punished; 4) “Why” were “certain interested and influential persons within the country … anxious to remove Liaquat”; 5) “Why” is the Quad-i-Azam’s name “being subtly and unjustly ignored”; 6) “Why” are these questions not answered. Liaquat’s son, Wilayat Ali Khan, also issued a statement in which he pointed to the political and economic deterioration of Pakistan in the past three years and called upon the Central and Provincial Governments to cooperate with the newly appointed foreign expert, C.P. U’ren in his investigation. The Karachi Muslim League organized a public meeting at Jehangir Park, Karachi, to commemorate the anniversary. The principal speaker, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, spoke generally on the “economic deterioration” of the country, provincialism, and eulogized the former Prime Minister. He claimed that Liaquat had been pressing for certain reforms at the time of his assassination. Nishtar was followed on the platform by Mohsin Siddiqi, General Secretary of the Karachi Muslim League adn by S. M. Taufique, President of the Karachi Muslim League. Weekly Summary of Political Events for Week Ending October 23, 1954, Oct. 23, 1954

Ghulam Mohammed

Ghulam Mohammed says he has no intention of dying before his work of building Pak has been reinforced and more progress made in organizing the Muslim world against Communism. He wants you to know that Zafrulla, Gurmani and he have no intention of allowing “India’s pin-pricks” to lead to an evolvement of war. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Sept. 7, 1951

Ghulam Mohammed emphatically repudiated the insinuation in some sections of the press that the help received by Pakistan from foreign countries had any political strings. He stated that “Pakistan’s freedom and independence were not for barter – but that it was an Islamic obligation to acknowledge kindness with gratitude.” Weekly Summary of Political and Economic Events – May 14-20, May 21, 1953

The subject of the Eyes Only telegram No. 341 of November 2 from Karachi on the question of the dangers of Pakistan constitutional development along theocratic lines was handled in the following manner. … The President did not refer directly to the question of religious influence referred to above but by his questions let it be known that we in the United States had an interest in seeing Pakistan work out her problems so that she would have an effective constitution. Discussion with Ghulam Mohammed, Nov. 13, 1953

Regarding Kashmir, I apprehended trouble from Nehru and he is now trying to use the American aid to us as an excuse for going back on international stipulations and obligations. We took a calculated risk in these two matters depending on your word and promise. I do hope you will stand by us so that Nehru is not allowed to get out of international obligations and is not able to throw dust in the eyes of the world over Kashmir on the excuse of American aid. I appreciate the delecacy of the situation, but I feel that my country can rely on your promise to ensure justice for us. Letter from Ghulam Mohammed to John Foster Dulles, March 23, 1954

The Embassy desires to emphasize again that these documents were given to the Ambassador in the strictest confidence and any revelation of the source would seriously damage relationships with the Governor General. … “I have in the course of my discussions regarding Arab countries joining USA and other countries in a plan for mutual defense, felt that there is a wave of opposition in some Arab countries and that others are lukewarm. My discussions have shown that this opposition proceeds from the causes set out below which need early attention … Transmittal of Revised Document Received from the Governor General, May 21, 1954

I told the Governor General that he was being credited by the U.S. with having been helpful in bettering relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States during the Haj visit, whereupon the Governor General said the King was just like a nephew to him. Memorandum of Conversation with Governor General Ghulam Mohammed, Nov. 4, 1954

Pakistan’s Leaders Face Difficulties in Achieving Political Stability, Feb. 4, 1955

Ghulam Mohammed has in fact assumed virtual dictatorial powers. Embassy convinced however Department’s assumption correct that immediate motive is to serve administrative convenience. … Re Callahan’s predictions concerning indefinite deferral democracy, Embassy considers these observations indicate failure understand real nature of problem here. Fact of matter is Pakistan lacks most of essential elements which provide basis for democratic government in Western countries and effort to judge developments here by degree which they approximate standards appropriate these countries altogether unrealistic and almost totally irrelevant. Secret Telgram from Karachi Embassy, March 30, 1955

According to a usually reliable source in the Governor-General’s household, Ghulam Mohammed kept General Mirza and Chaudhri Mohammad Ali on tenterhooks for several days as he refused to sign the resignation prepared for him. He was rational for several days preceding the ceremonial ten described in the referenced despatch but “childishly” stubborn about signing away the last vestige of his rule. His daughter’s and son-in-law’s entreaties failed, but an aide finally persuaded him to sign by promising him a trip to his favorite Muslim shrine near Lucknow, India. The source, a layman, described Ghulam Mohammed’s mental affliction as a failure of blood supply to one portion of the brain. This condition is permanent; Ghulam Mohammed’s health continues to improve but he will never again have the full use of his faculties. For almost two months after his stroke on June 27 Ghulam Mohammed’s utterances were 90 percent irrational; the proportion is now reversed. Ghulam Mohammed’s Resignation, Sept. 23, 1955

Iskander Mirza

Lt. Col Iskander Mirza, Secy of Defense Ministry, today asked Emb Army Attache pass following to me: Major General Akbar Khan “is 100 percent Communist” and has been in contact with Communists since he recently took up his job as Chief of Staff at Rawalpindi. In personal opinion Col Mirza, conspirators motivated by dissatisfaction with GOP handling of Kashmir issue and feeling that Pak should turn away from Western powers and toward Soviet Union. In addition to those whose arrest has been announced, Air Commodore Janjua, senior Pak airman recently returned from school in UK is under house arrest. Janjua is known to have been in contact with conspiring army officers. Two unnamed communists, presumably civilian, are being sought but have gone underground. Brigadier Hussain, Director Interservices Intelligence, expressed opinion to Army Attache that there is some unrest in Pak Army especially among junior officers and enlisted men, because of failure to settle Kashmir issue. Some members of Army strongly believe a change in Govt is only solution. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, March 10, 1951

When I called upon Sec Def (Mirza) this date on the MDAP matter he volunteered the following information which he asked me to pass on to the American Ambassador: a. Major General Akhbar Khan, senior military man involved in the conspiracy, is 100% communist. When he came to Rawalpindi as Chief of General Staff he contacted the communists of the Punjab. b. In addition to the people mentioned in the paper as having been arrested, the senior Pakistani Air Officer, Air Commodore Jinjua, recently returned from UK is in “house arrest.” He had conferred with the defecting army officers. c. In the opinion of Colonel Mirza, dissatisfaction with the handling of the Kashmir affair is probably behind this affair. He thinks that these officers wish to change their governments orientation from the West to Russia. d. He thinks that the Russian Embassy to Pakistan had something to do with the plot. He said that the Embassy had spent considerable money in the Punjab, to the extent of giving cameras to people. Secret Memorandum for the Record, March 10, 1951

Colonel Mirza, GOP Defense Secretary, stated to ConGen while visiting Lahore that Martial Law should be continued for a considerable period, in order that the politicians woudl understand that they had a duty of patriotism toward the country and could not act for their own selfish purposes. He did not indicate what period of time Martial Law would remain in force. He also stated that it was necessary that the civilian authorities did not revoke any of the Court Martial sentences. Without making a statement to that effect, he gave the impression that he was of the opinion that Daultana should be removed. Weekly Summary of Political and Economic Events, March 12-18, 1953, March 19, 1953 [emphasis in original]

I am convinced that at the present time the Government of Pakistan is being influenced strongly by a group of civil servants who have the backing, if not the actual participation, of the Pakistan Army. As far as I can determine, the definite members of this clique are Iskander Mirza, Akhtar Husain, and Agha Hilaly. Inasmuch as it is almost impossible for anything to happen at the secretarial level without the knowledge of the Cabinet Secretary, Aziz Ahmad, and inasmuch as he attended the Cabinet meeting on the night of February 26 at which the decision was taken to act firmly in the religious agitation, it is more than probably that Aziz is a participant. More than likely his brother, Ghulam Ahmad, the Interior Secretary and Intelligence Chief, is also involved. … I do not believe the group has influence or power enough yet to dictate political decisions to the Prime Minister. … AS you will recall from my conversation with General Ayub, I was told by Ayub that while he was reluctant to enter politics, he would take “no nonsense from the Center.” That, of course, was before the declaration of martial law in Lahore. Iskander Mirza subsequently told Col. Ashworth that as long as the Central Government proceeded in the right direction it would have Army support. He, too, implied that they would step in if there were signs of deviation from the present firm policy. Top Secret Office Memorandum of Karachi Embassy, April 6, 1953

Gen. Iskander Mirza leaves tonight midnight for Dacca to assume Governorship East Bengal tomorrow. … Impossible predict reaction East Bengal; violence certainly may occur. Mirza emphasizes has no desire rule by military force alone recognizes necessity establish clean administration. At same time he may be ruthless toward Communists. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, May 29, 1954

PriMin asked me to see him this morning. He said in view close relationships our two countries he was telling me in greatest confidence that decision had been taken impose Governor’s rule East Pakistan. Governor would be Iskander Mirza who was summoned from London and who will leave for Dacca tomorrow. … PriMin stated first act of Governor would be to arrest known communists. … PriMin stated intensified activity would proceed two fronts, psychological and economic. GOP plan establish two new radio stations East Bengal, step up informational program to high degree. On economic front Governor would see that peopel received cheap necessities of life, namely food, cloth, kerosene, mustard oil and salt. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, May 29, 1954

Iskander Mirza sworn in as Governor East Bengal 1800 hours. N.M. Khan Chief Secretary GOEB. Section 92-A (Governor’s rule) effective 1800 hours. IG police states District Magistrates to be given free hand for arrest “subversives”. Minister Sheikh Mujibir Rahman will be arrested immediately. Confidential Telegram from Dacca Consulate, May 31, 1954

“The present Governor of East Bengal has for private and personal reasons expressed a desire to be relieved of his office. It has therefore been decided to replace him by Major General Iskander Mirza who will be sworn in today.” Telgram from Karachi Embassy, June 1, 1954

Mirza said the only way for the US to stiffen Ali’s spine was to tighten the windscrew of economic and military assistance, making such assistance clearly dependent upon assurances of sane govt in Karachi. Mirza strongly recommended this course of action to US and stated his belief that Ali would respond favorably. Secret Telegram from London Embassy, Oct. 4, 1954

Mirza says he refused urgent calls return Karachi from London to await Primin. Believes Sunday’s action in best interests country, especially retaining Primin. Asked whether he expected trouble Mirza replied “We will make trouble,” meaning guilty would be punished. Said much to be cleaned up; for example Primin now finally recognized Mirza right in asking punishment corrupt Bengalis. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Oct. 26, 1954

Major General Mirza has said that democracy ran riot during the last seven years. It was not democracy but the denial of democratic rights that was responsible for the harm that has been done to our dear country. Had democracy a fair play, the evils would have been corrected long ago. UF Statement on General Mirza, Nov. 19, 1954

Comment on future form of government in Pakistan, Dec. 24, 1954

According to the Gazette of Pakistan dated January 21, 1955, Major General Iskander Mirza, C.S.P., retired from Government Service with effect from October 24, 1954. In effect this post-dated action removes from General Mirza the onus of having been appointed to a Cabinet post while still a member of the Civil Service. Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Jan. 25, 1955

Pakistani government will ignore challenge to its legality, Feb. 12, 1955

Iskander Mirza speaking February 15 to newly-organized West Pakistan Brotherhood praised Armed Forces highly and denied they taking active interest politics, and said “they have never taken part in politics nor is there any danyer that they will do so.” Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Feb. 17, 1955

Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, March 11, 1955

NSC Briefing: Background — Estimated Balances in Pakistan Politics, June 12, 1956

Secret Letter from Ambassador Hildreth to John Foster Dulles, Sept. 20, 1956

April 1953 Coup

Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, April 18, 1953

Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embassy, April 19, 1953

It becomes clear that Nazimuddin dismissal was planned and accomplished through combined efforts of Army leadership (specifically Def Secy Iskander Mirza and C-in-C Gen Ayub) and Gov Gen himself. Frustration which EMB has reported over past few months grew to exasperation at weakness and vascillation of Nazimuddin. Without doubt action by Iskander Mirza to declare martial law in Lahore Mar 6 in spite of PRIMIN objections saved country from what might have become national disaster. Mirza has apparently been in close touch with Gov Gen. Decision was taken by Gov Gen himself that PRIMIN could not be successfully managed and dismissal was planned. EMB believes very few people in Govt were privy to this decision – perhaps no one except Mirza and Ayub. … EMB believes unity now exists in country which has not prevailed since assassination Liaquat. Army is in firm position and will brook no nonsense. Whether Mohammad Ali will be able rise to demands of situation is not entirely certain and it is possible stronger leader such as Qayyum may take over at later date. EMB believes that in this favorable situation, US faces great opportunities develop closer relations with Pakistan and influence PAK policy toward settlement outstanding issues and toward firmer commitments to free world. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, April 20, 1953

Perhaps this is the true picture: the Governor-General, Mr. Ghulam Mohammed could never have dared to dismiss a Ministry which had appointed him, had he not have had the support of the Army. The Army would take its cue from the Defense Secretariat. Therefore this is in fact a coup d’etat by Mr. Iskander Mirza and the Army, which has nominated Mr. Mohammed Ali as its agent. The Army (which includes Mr. Iskander Mirza) would not have been encouraged to do this, if it was not certain that the new dispensation would have the support of the Americans, on whom today Pakistan is almost wholly dependent for its food requirements, and to carry on the ordinary expenses of the Administration. We can give this credit to the Army that it, like other common citizens, saw that the country was going to the dogs, that the prevailing regime had lost the confidence of the people, that it had not the capacity to remedy the existing state of affairs, and that at the same time it could not carry the people with it in any of its measures. The Army, too, may have started getting ideas after its contact with the people and the civil administration in Lahore. The Americans must have been in contact with the Army, and the coup d’etat must have had their blessings. The Americans must have found (i) That there was no point in butressing an unpopular Ministry. (ii) There there was no point in giving supplies to an incompetent Ministry which would dissipate those supplies. (iii) That there was no hope of getting appropriation from Congress unless it was satisfied that the Ministry in Pakistan had popular support and Army support. (iv) That an unpopular Ministry cannot succeed in inducing the people to accept its policy in international affairs, and hence such a Ministry is useless to the Americans if they want Pakistan to accept the international policy of America. That is to say an unpopular Ministry in Pakistan cannot deliver the goods and is therefore useless for the American global strategy. The change in the Administration is therefore a result of American plus Army maneuvers, born of the conviction, for which there is every justification, that Nazimuddin’s regime was thoroughly unpopular and incompetent. Letter from H.S. Suhrawardy, April 21, 1953

Reversing their earlier critical attitude toward Nazimuddin, [the Awami League] are now shedding crocodile tears over his removal from the Prime Ministership, asserting that GHULAM MUHAMMED and his cronies from the Punjab had determined to eliminate Nazimuddin because he supported the provision in the BPC Report for “parity” between East Bengal and the rest of Pakistan in representation in the National Legislature. Political, Press and Economic Developments for the Week Ending June 24, 1953, June 25, 1953

Constititional Coup of September 21, 1954

Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Sept. 22, 1954

Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Sept. 25, 1954

Pakistan Political Crisis, Sept. 25, 1954

Unsigned Top Secret Telegram #74, Sept. 25, 1954

Top Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Sept. 27, 1954

The “Constitutional Coup” in the Constituent Assembly, Oct. 2, 1954

Divestment of Governor General’s Powers by Constituent Assembly, Oct. 3, 1954

Reftel and other recent Karachi messages seem clearly imply new group may well try seize control GOP within next few months. Motives and character Consembly rebellious element indicate new govt would be more to right than current clique with conservative “old Moslem leaguers” in dominant position but with little chance of communist or other leftist influence. Dept concedes good possibility such group might be less cooperative, less friendly to United States than present PriMin. Secret Telegram from John Foster Dulles, Oct. 6, 1954

While agree change Govt would not increase Communist leftist influence, situation East Bengal different from that West Pakistan. Commies stronger East Bengal would exploit instability which might result. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Oct. 7, 1954

Mohammed Ayub Khan

The Department of Defense has reported that the Military Attache in Karachi has recently recommended the award of the Legion of Merit to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, General Mohammed AYUB Khan, stating that this recommendation is strongly supported by the Ambassador. Secret Telegram from Department of State, July 10, 1951

General Ayub stated that he had been talking to the leading politicians of Pakistan, and had told them that they must make up their mind to go whole-heartedly with the West. … He stated that the Pakistan Army will not allow the political leaders to get out of hand,and the same is true regarding the people of Pakistan. He stated that he realized that the Army was taking on a large responsibility, but that the Army’s duty was to protect the country. Secret Telegram from Lahore Consulate, Dec. 23, 1952

The Commander-in-Chief stated that he felt that there was no danger, from either politicians or the public, to overthrow the present Government, but in case there was such an attempt the Pakistan Army would immediately declare martial law and take charge of the situation. If the situation was critical, the Army would declare a Military Government in order to secure stability for Pakistan. He stated the Pakistan Army would not allow either politicians or the public to ruin the country. Top Secret Despatch from Lahore Consulate, Feb. 13, 1953

He said that the army was not interested in going into politics but that he had no intention of letting things get out of control. He said the army was a stabilizing force in Pakistan and that he would take no nonsense from the politicians. … I got the distinct impression from Ayub and from subsequent conversations with his senior officers who were in Lahore at the same time, that the Pakistan Army is definitely ready to take control should Civil Government break down, although they would be reluctant to do so. Memorandum of Conversation with General Mohammad Ayub Khan, Feb. 28, 1953

I took General Ayub for cocktails last evening and he is very much discouraged with our Number One guest who arrives in Washington this afternoon. He thinks there may be repercussions along the lines of your recent cables but expresses no alarm as far as the country as a whole is concerned. He is terribly confident of the ability of the Armed Services to step in any time as, if and when necessary. Secret Telegram from State Department, Oct. 14, 1954

NSC Briefing: Pakistan, Oct. 29, 1958

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

It will be noted that he was accused inter alia of incitement of the masses to violate law and create disorder, violation of Secton 144, speaking so as to excite disaffection with the GOP, and disclosures of state affairs regarding weapons supply. Grounds for Detention of Bhutto, Dec. 4, 1968

MI officer told him that 24 officers arrested had been plotting to assassinate President Bhutto at Lahore People’s festival (revival of old Lahore horse show) when he attended as chief guest on March 31. Report of Military Assassination Plot Against President Bhutto, April 2, 1970

Central Intelligence Bulletin, Dec. 24, 1971

On February 7, I made a routine call on Rao Rashid, Deputy Director of Intelligence. … It was tragic, mused Rao, to have a man at the helm who despite all the blunders he committed, refused to step aside to the end, even though the nation was being destroyed. Political Notes, Feb. 17, 1972

Level of political violence and shrillness of political rhetoric has been on increase recently. Apart from Sind language riots, there have been disorderly political incidents in Lahore, Rawalpindi and elsewhere. Heightened political atmosphere has coincided with Bhutto’s greater involvement in grass-roots politics in wake Sind riots. While regime’s miscalculations and oppostion irresponsibility have contributed to new atmosphere, it seems also to reflect degree of return to pre-1971 “politics as usual.” Although disquieting, trend toward violence does not yet threaten Bhutto regime. Main present danger is that regime will be goaded into more repressive measures which could feed still more violence. Domestic Political Violence on Increase Aftermath Sind Disturbances, Aug. 4, 1972

Pakistan: Factionalism in Bhutto’s Party, July 1, 1975

Jamaat-e-Islami

Jamaat-e-Islami, which translated literally means “Islamic Organization,” is a Mullah-led, reactionary Islamic political party. Prior to partition the Jamaat, founded in 1941, was an inactive religious group without major interest in politics. However, since partition it has assumed an active part in politics and has gained strength, although it still plays a minor part in Pakistan politics. … At the annual meeting of Jamaat-e-Islami held on November 10 through 13, party leaders displayed an interesting combination of reactionary religious ideology, communist line propaganda and ideas of the welfare state. The meeting was attended by delegates from all over Pakistan. … Certainly not a powerful force in Pakistan politics today … the party is significant as an example of reactionary Islam in Pakistan politics. Annual Meeting of Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan, Nov. 28, 1951

The information contained in this report is from Ghulam Mohammed, Secty. Karachi Jamaat-i-Islami. He was anxious to get information on this organization into the hands of the American Embassy, he stated, because the organization “is misunderstood by foreign embassies and is the target of false propaganda from the Muslim League.” Jamaat-i-Islami (Islamic Party) was established in pre-partitioned India in 1941. Its main object is “revival of Islam, in both letter and spirit. We believe Islam is a complete code of life. We believe in democracy, with some changes regarding the limits of legislation. We believe that the government should be run by the people, but that the representatives are duty-bound to fulfill the laws written in the H.Q. Confidential Embassy notes, author unknown, circa 1951

Thirteen members of the Jamaat-e-Islami have been taken into custody by the Martial Law Authorities in Lahore including Maulana Maudoodi, Mian Tufail Mohammad and Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi. Eighteen other Jamaat-e-Islami members were arrested outside the Lahore Martial Law area under the Provincial Public Safety Act. Comment: Maulana Maudoodi was one of the few prominent religious leaders who had escaped arrest during the general round-up of extremist Mullahs. He has now been arrested on the strength of a pamphlet which was just published in which Maudoodi tried to attack the Ahmadiyas by clever implications without indulging in open incitation. Martial Law authorities howwever felt that he had overstepped and thereupon arrested him. Weekly Summary of Political and Economic Events, March 26-April 1, 1953, April 2, 1953

Maulana Maudoodi, leader of Jamaat-i-Islami, arrested Mar 28 during anti-Ahmadiya agitation in Lahore, found guilty of complicity in riots by military tribunal May 11, and sentenced to death. Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embassy, May 12, 1953

Following the protest meeting and strike on the 14th occasioned by the sentence of Maulana Maudoodi reported in the Consulate’s despatch 96 dated May 14, 1953, an effort was made to organize a Maudoodi Day on May 22. Whereas the first demonstration was organized by Ulemas, the one scheduled for the 22nd was sparked by political opposition groups headed by the Awami League. Political, Press, and Economic Developments for the Week Ending May 27, 1953, May 28, 1953

Congen has no rpt no information to confirm GOI intelligence report that Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) groups planning attacks on Indian diplomats. Although prior to partition, JI supported Congress Party and opposed creation of Pakistan, JI has adopted anti-Indian position since partition. Its leaders, including recently retired Maulana Maudoodi, have advocated both moral and secular legality. Report of Planned Terrorist Attacks on Indian Diplomats, Nov. 7, 1972

Muslim Brotherhood

The Embassy’s confidential source stated that the organization was almost still-born, with no activities and few members. It is believed, however, that a recent conference of world Muslim divines held in Karachi may have given a fillip to the branch. In addition to Mahmoud Sawwaf there were several Middle Eastern Akhwan leaders at the conference. Hassan-ul-Hudeibi, the president of the Brotherhood did not come from Cairo but sent as his deputy Allama Mahmood-uz-Zubairi of Yemen. As-Syed Baha El-Amiri, the erstwhile Syrian Ambassador to Pakistan, fired from his job as a result of differences with Colonel Shishakly, was at the conference as Syrian delegate. Before his diplomatic appointment, El-Amiri was an officer in the Syrian Brotherhood. Another Akhwan leader, Sheikh Syed Ramazan of Egypt was also in attendence.

The World Muslim Conference (Motamar-e-Alam-e-Islam) in Karachi sponsored a meeting on February 23 in observance of “Hasan-el-Banna Day” which was presided over by the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem and addressed by El-Amiri and Syed Ramazan; the latter was termed the son-in-law of Hasan-el-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. Although the Secretary of the World Muslim Conference in conversation with officers of the Embassy evinced little interest in the formation of the Brotherhood, it is possible that the Motamar will support the embryonic organization. Formation of Muslim Brotherhood Branch in Pakistan, Feb. 28, 1952

Matta Riot

The Anti-Christian Riot at Matta, Aug. 28, 1951

Memorandum of Conversation with Rev. Frank Llewellen, Aug. 16, 1951

Of the 22 defendants, two were sentenced to death and 10 were sentenced to 19 years. The drafting officer has spoken to a few lawyers in Lahoer regarding these sentences. All were of the opinion that the two sentenced to death would have their sentence commuted to 15 years, and the others to 5-8 years by the reviewing court. The Christian missionaries with whom the drafting officer has spoken in regards to the trial all feel satisfied that justice was done – even if the sentences are commuted. Confidential Despatch from Lahore Consulate, Dec. 21, 1951

Anti-Communist Program in East Pakistan

PURPOSE: To destroy Communist influence and develop a positive (counter) program based on the new national ideals of Pakistan. … Collaboration between the USIS and the Government of East Bengal is to be kept secret. To this end every attempt will be made to keep knowledge of the program confined to the three officers of the American Consulate and the three officers of the Government of East Bengal whose concerted effort is necesssary to the formulation of plans and policies.

OPERATIONAL THEMES: … To link communism with imperialism by demonstrating that the original meaning of the word is being used as a cloak for planned conquest. … To show the communists as anti-God and therefore a threat to the continued existence of the Muslim world as a free and independent religio-political entity. … To promote the Islamic socio-economic concept under which there will be freedom and dignity for the individual and which will provide for the elimination of economic disparities and inequities. Coordinated Program for Combatting Communism in East Bengal, Aug. 7, 1951

Developments in Iran and Egypt are seriously affecting Pakistan popular position reference United States and we should now expect period of critical attitudes. This change may imperil parts of information program. Clearly any revelation of my private understanding with top GOP officials will create greatest embarrassment to them. … View GOP changing position it is most imperative that all discussion be halted bringing GOEB personnel to Washington for discussion this highly delicate operation. If information officer GOEB is later sent to US as Leader Specialist, he should be given leader itinerary treatment and should not repeat not be consulted about policy matters affecting cooperation East Pakistan. We must assume he does not know of my overall understanding. Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Nov. 5, 1951

Re Leader-Grant for either GOP or GOEB official, Department merely indicated availability of Grant in relation to request contained in Dacca Despatch 13; with assumption Embassy retaining actual perogative of nominating whomever desirable. If Embassy does desire send any official as straight leader-grantee, special project will not be discussed in Washington as you recommend. Secret Telegram from State Department, Nov. 16, 1951

Department will not invite GOEB official for purpose discussing subject your Despatch 13. However, ordinary leader-grant can at some future date be offered a Dacca journalist or even GOEB official, under normal Embassy selection processes. Secret Telegram from Secretary of State, Nov. 17, 1951

Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Feb. 23, 1952

Confidential Telegram from Dacca Consulate, Feb. 28, 1952

Chief Minister Nurul Amin attended a meeting of the Mymensingh District Muslim League workers on June 14 and addressed the conference at some length. He reviewed the origins of, and government action during the Dacca riots in February, and announced that he had conclusive proof that these groups of people, viz. communists, other foreign agents, and political mal-contents had conspired to subvert the state from within. As for the communists, he quoted from a Calcutta communist paper which boasted of the party’s assisting the Language Movement in the right direction. As to the foreign agents, he dramatically flourished a secret document which he said was a circular of February 12 of an organization with headquarters outside Pakistan calling upon its members in East Pakistan to exploit the Language Movement. The name of the organization he withheld in the public interest. As for the disgruntled politicians, he observed that they are well known, and their motive in mising into the Language Movement and the riots was to split East and West Pakistan (he did not refer to the United Bengalers as such, but he evidently had them in mind). Confidential Telegram from Dacca Consulate, June 21, 1952

Confidential Telegram from New Delhi Embassy, Feb. 27, 1953

Telegram from New Delhi Embassy, May 6, 1954

Political, Press and Economic Developments for the Week Ended May 21, 1953, May 22, 1953

Telegram from Karachi Embassy, May 26, 1954

Political Developments for the Two Weeks Ending December 16, 1953, Dec. 17, 1953

Meanwhile there remains somewhat uncomfortably in my mind real concern over the Governor General’s attitude and approach to affairs these days. … I certainly do not see how running around East Bengal smashing Commies has much relation to what happened to the League in that province. Of course I see where a good Commie campaign might help disrupt the UF — but then what? Governor’s Rule? Martial law? The League has some hard lessons to learn. I hope the price won’t be too high or the instruction period too long. Secret Telegram from State Department, April 27, 1954

Agitation in East Bengal Schools and Colleges, Sept. 29, 1955

Political Attitudes and Opinions, East Pakistan, April 28, 1955

Gov. told me today will outlaw commie party East Bengal tomorrow. Said requested authorization from Center mid-June but only answer to date is under consideration. Thus, following abortive commie attempt few days ago blow up main bridge into Dacca he has decided to proceed [unilaterally]. Center as yet uninformed but will receive telegram from Gov. simultaneously with announcement of demarche. Confidential Telegram from Dacca Consulate, July 6, 1954

Overt Activities by Communists and Other Former Security Prisoners, Nov. 16, 1955

Misc Political

Political, Press and Economic Developments for the Period Ending April 29, 1953, May 1, 1953

Political, Press and Economic Developments for the Period Ending April 21, 1953, April 22, 1953

The subject of U.S. military aid to Pakistan remained the dominant political theme during the week. On December 19, 1953, the Government of Pakistan presented a note to the Soviet Embassy in Karachi replying to the Soviet note of November 30 which demanded “clarification” of the press reported on the subject of “American military air bases” in Pakistan. … The Indian National Congress party’s drive to arouse public opinion in India against US military aid to Pakistan evoked a bitter reaction in Pakistan. Public opinion media referred to it as a “hate campaign” and held it to be particularly significant as it was government sponsored. Weekly Summary of Political Events for Week Ending December 24, 1953, Dec. 24, 1953

Weekly Summary of Political Developments for Week Ending December 19, 1953, Dec. 19, 1953

Summary of Political Developments for the Week Ending June 19, 1953, June 20, 1953

Weekly Summary, Political and Economic Events 29 October thru 4 November 1953, Nov. 5, 1953

Weekly Summary of Political and Economic Events, Sept. 24 through Sept. 30, 1953, Oct. 1, 1953

Weekly Political and Economic Report, Jan. 25 – Feb. 1, 1953, Feb. 2, 1953

Political and Economic Developments for the Week August 10-16, 1952

Political and Economic Developments July 15-21, 1952, July 21, 1952

Political and Economic Developments July 8-14, 1952, July 14, 1952

Political and Economic Developments for the Week Ending April 3, 1952, April 3, 1952

Political and Economic Developments for the Week Ending, March 20, 1952, March 20, 1952

Anti-Ahmadiya Agitation in Lahore, March 10, 1953

Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Feb. 28, 1953

Political and Economic Developments in East Pakistan During Week Ending March 14, 1952, March 15, 1952

Political and Economic Developments in East Pakistan During Two Weeks Ending March 7, 1952, March 8, 1952

Weekly Summary Dec 15-21, 1952, Dec. 22, 1952

Weekly Summary, Dec. 1-16, 1952, Dec. 8, 1952

Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Jan. 16, 1953

Confidential Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Feb. 18, 1953

The Islamic Constitution of Pakistan, Jan. 11, 1954

Brief resume of talks between the Honourable Prime Minister and the Vice-President of U.S.A., held on 7-12-53, July 12, 1953

Memorandum of Conversation with Yusuf Haroon, April 3, 1954

Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Sept. 19, 1955

Secret Telegram from Karachi Embassy, Aug. 12, 1955

Current Position of Communism in Pakistan, July 10, 1953

The Pakistan National Alliance: Participants and Prospects, circa Aug. 1977

Pakistan’s Problems, Jan. 8, 1979

Suhrawardy Scores Victory Over Leftist Opponents in East Pakistan, June 16, 1957

Resignation of Pakistani Prime Minister Suhrawardy, Oct. 12, 1957

Copyright Paul Wolf, 2003-2004. No copyright to original government works. For educational use only.

APPENDIX B

Sunday, December 5, 2004off the shelf
Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan and Partition
V. N. DattaDear Mr Jinnah: Selected Correspondence and Speeches of Liaquat Ali Khan, 1937-1947edited by Professor Roger D. Long with a foreword by Stanely Wolpert. Oxford University Press, Karachi. Pages 328. Price not stated.

This compilation of selected correspondence and speeches of Liaquat Ali Khan, that comes with a foreword by Stanely Wolpert, well-known Jinnah biographer, focuses on highly significant issues and events which proved crucial in the creation of Pakistan. Of special interest to the reader is the author’s prefatory notes.

The period (1937-1947) chosen by Professor Long is momentous in the making of Pakistan. In the pre-1937 period, the Muslim League was a weak and inert organisation, destitute of leadership, funds and the press. It was seen as a coterie of toadies and sycophants basking in the sunshine of British patronage, passing stereotyped, mild resolutions for the protection of Muslims interests and making speeches in the Assemblies and at the Muslim League annual sessions. Mohammad Ali Jinnah then counted nowhere. He was rebuffed by the stalwart Muslim leader, Fazl-I-Husain in Punjab, and distrusted by the Congress. The British ignored him.

By 1939, the Muslim League became a strong and spirited organisation,

and in March 1940, it demanded a separate homeland, an independent, sovereign Pakistan State, and by 1945, Jinnah emerged as the sole spokesman of the Muslims, who made high bids and vetoed all constitutional proposals suggested by the Congress and the British government. He scuttled the Simla conference in June-July 1945 and asked for parity with the Congress in the Viceroy’s executive council.

Jinnah met Mahatma Gandhi on equal terms for negotiation to resolve the political stalemate at home on Malabar Hill in Bombay from September 9 to 29, 1945, and rejected his formula. He took to task the three Premieres, Sikander Hayat Khan of Punjab, Fazl-ul-Haq of Bengal, and Saadullah of Assam, for joining the National Defence Council by subverting the Muslim League resolution of September 29, 1940.

By 1945, the Muslim League succeeded in setting up its party ministry in four of the provinces, and in the fifth, it held a strong position by putting pressure on the dispirited and shrinking Unionists party in Punjab.

This work is more an exchange between Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan on matters

relating to the radicalisation of Muslim politics when both were engaged in a life-and-death struggle for the creation of Pakistan. It throws more light on Jinnah than on Liaquat Ali Khan.

There is nothing personal in these letters, despite Liaquat Ali Khan’s efforts to engage Jinnah in it. Jinnah was a hard nut to crack, icy cold, reserved, taciturn, who praised or complimented none, and yet showed no tension. He was secretive. Even though he drew up his will in 1939 and appointed Liaquat Ali Khan his trustee for it, he never told him so, and it was only after his death that the latter learnt of it.

An utterly lonely man, Jinnah was incapable of maintaining a loving relationship with anyone. It would have been a treasure trove to read Jinnah’s love letters to his wife Rattenbai Petet or to anyone, but such a document nowhere exits.

Jinnah’s relationship with his colleagues was not the kind that the Mahatma shared with his party workers. He chose no heir, though he regarded Liaquat Ali Khan as his right hand. The correspondence shows that Jinnah lived like an Englishman.

He was fabulously rich and invested a great deal of money in shares and property. On several occasions, the Muslim Legaue borrowed money from his personal coffers. It is incredible that by addressing his huge audience in English who did not understand what he was saying, he captured their hearts and imagination and fired them with a passion to throw in their lot with him.

Belonging to the well-known aristocratic family of Punjab and being son of the Nawab of Karnal, Liaquat Ali Khan inherited a huge property in Meerut. After taking BA from Oxford and Bar-at-law, he returned to India at the end of 1922 and joined the Muslim League in 1923. As an Independent, he served as Deputy Speaker in the UP Council in 1931. As a member of the United Provinces National Agricultural Party, he represented the landed interests and opposed the separate electorate before the Joint Statutory Commission which came out of the Round Table Conference in the early 1930s.

He became the General-Secretary of the Muslim League in 1936 and held this office till 1947 and slaved for the success of its mission. He became the Finance Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council in 1946 and the first Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1947. Scrupulously honest, he refused to accept property in Pakistan in exchange for his land holdings in India, and after his death, his son and his wife, a Christian, Ranana Sheila Irene Pant, had to live in a house donated by the government.

This work projects Liaquat Ali Khan as a mild, well-meaning man of moderate disposition who shunned controversies. Mediocre in intellect, his sincerity of purpose and dedication made it easier for him to inspire confidence among his party workers. This work shows how the Muslims felt threatened by Hindu majoritarianism and feared that the Federation as envisaged under the Government of India Act (1935) would complete their disaster.

By mobilising the Muslim mass support, Jinnah widened his political base to fight the Congress. One is tempted to conclude from this work that the Congress was outmanoeuvred by Jinnah’s brilliant strategy and leadership, and Liaquat Ali Khan’s famous budget speech on February 28, 1947, in the Legislative Assembly, which hit the business magnets supporting the Congress, turned the tide in the Congress in favour of Partition. On March 3, 1947, Khizar Hayat Khan was forced to resign as Chief Minister due to Muslim League pressure, and the way was clear for the creation of Pakistan.

The editing and annotation of Long’s work is superb and the explanatory notes are suavely perceptive. However, Long’s praise of Stanely Wolport’s studies of Nehru and Jinnah is unjustified; he completely ignores S. Gopal’s comprehensive biography of Nehru. He also tends to ignore the Congress viewpoint on important political situations.

• On deconstructing the wrong paradigm
• http://moinansari.wordpress.com/2007/11/27/u-turn-in-our-thinking-deconstructing-the-wrong-paradigm/
• Rebutting Cohen
• http://moinansari.wordpress.com/2007/11/30/rebuttal-to-cohen%e2%80%99s-four-crises-and-a-peace-process-kargil-internationalized-the-kasmir-issue-and-put-a-death-knell-to-simla/
• Another prophecy of doom
• http://moinansari.wordpress.com/2007/11/27/here-we-go-again-another-indian-prophecy-of-doom-the-first-one-came-in-1947/
• Pakistanis want to hear “Thank You” for the US
• http://moinansari.wordpress.com/2007/11/27/pakistanis-want-to-hear-thank-you-and-are-sick-of-do-more/
• Pakistanis to USA: We want “Friends Not Masters”
• http://moinansari.wordpress.com/2007/11/27/%e2%80%9cfriends-not-masters%e2%80%9d-a-response-to-deception-hiding-in-plain-sight-pakistan-and-nuclear-proliferation-by-chuck-leddy/
• Say Thank You
• http://moinansari.wordpress.com/2007/11/27/ingrate-friends-should-say-%e2%80%9cthank-you%e2%80%9d-instead-of-%e2%80%9cdo-more%e2%80%9d/
• Pakistan US Relations should be normal not transactional
• http://moinansari.wordpress.com/pak-american-relationship-should-not-be-transactionalit-should-be-normalread-bidens-only-comments/
• Response to Congressman Hoyer on Pakistan
• http://moinansari.wordpress.com/2007/11/27/letter-to-congressman-hoyer-about-pakistan/
• On inadequate US Aid
• http://moinansari.wordpress.com/2007/12/09/us-may-boost-accountability-for-aid-to-pakistan-pakistan-should-revise-the-bill/
• Where is Osama Bin Laden
• http://moinansari.wordpress.com/2007/12/09/2008-where-is-the-world-is-osama-bin-laden-someone-knows/
• Where are the Pakistani nukes?
• http://moinansari.wordpress.com/the-mere-suggestion-that-the-cia-includes-all-agencies-knows-realties-on-the-ground-in-pakistan-is-laughable-the-pakistanis-are-not-stupid-they-are-fully-aware-of-american-plans-the-hindu/
• Criticism of Benazir Bhutto’s 5E Campaign program
• Criticism of Benazir Bhutto. Pre-Assassination
• Who killed Liaqat Ali Khan?
  On deconstructing the wrong paradigm of the USA media
  Rebutting Cohen
  Pakistanis are immune to another prophecy of doom
  Pakistanis want to hear “Thank You” from the ingrate Americans. Nothing is good enough!
  Pakistanis to USA: We want “Friends Not Masters”
  Say Thank You
  Pakistan US Relations should be normal not transactional
  Response to Congressman Hoyer on Pakistan”
  On inadequate US Aid to Pakistan
  Where is Osama Bin Laden
  Where are the Pakistani nukes?
• Where is Leadership of the PPP? Why is it behaving like Nero. Stop the arson and the carnage. Ask for a national Day of prayer and reconciliation
• Open Letter to Mr. 10% Asif Zardari. Show some leadership
• Open Letter to Mr. Bilawal Bhutto
• The CIA connection—Benazir Bhutto assassination was pre-planned, the Zia model with a twist
• Benzir Bhuttos revenge from the grave: Annointing a despised and corrupt politician Mr. 10% as her successor
• Open letter to Mr. Zardari
• The 4th Bhutto assassination is a message to the USA. Hands Off Pakistan
• Here we go again! Another Indian prophecy of doom. The first one was in 1947
• We would like to refer our readers to the an article on “Toppling the US military” that is worth its weight in gold. Search for it on this site.
  See: “Kissinger threatened Zulifiqar Ali Bhutto”

The period (1937-1947) chosen by Professor Long is momentous in the making of Pakistan. In the pre-1937 period, the Muslim League was a weak and inert organisation, destitute of leadership, funds and the press. It was seen as a coterie of toadies and sycophants basking in the sunshine of British patronage, passing stereotyped, mild resolutions for the protection of Muslims interests and making speeches in the Assemblies and at the Muslim League annual sessions. Mohammad Ali Jinnah then counted nowhere. He was rebuffed by the stalwart Muslim leader, Fazl-I-Husain in Punjab, and distrusted by the Congress. The British ignored him.

By 1939, the Muslim League became a strong and spirited organisation, and in March 1940, it demanded a separate homeland, an independent, sovereign Pakistan State, and by 1945, Jinnah emerged as the sole spokesman of the Muslims, who made high bids and vetoed all constitutional proposals suggested by the Congress and the British government. He scuttled the Simla conference in June-July 1945 and asked for parity with the Congress in the Viceroy’s executive council.

Jinnah met Mahatma Gandhi on equal terms for negotiation to resolve the political stalemate at home on Malabar Hill in Bombay from September 9 to 29, 1945, and rejected his formula. He took to task the three Premieres, Sikander Hayat Khan of Punjab, Fazl-ul-Haq of Bengal, and Saadullah of Assam, for joining the National Defence Council by subverting the Muslim League resolution of September 29, 1940.

..Belonging to the well-known aristocratic family of Punjab and being son of the Nawab of Karnal, Liaquat Ali Khan inherited a huge property in Meerut. After taking BA from Oxford and Bar-at-law, he returned to India at the end of 1922 and joined the Muslim League in 1923. As an Independent, he served as Deputy Speaker in the UP Council in 1931. As a member of the United Provinces National Agricultural Party, he represented the landed interests and opposed the separate electorate before the Joint Statutory Commission which came out of the Round Table Conference in the early 1930s.

He became the General-Secretary of the Muslim League in 1936 and held this office till 1947 and slaved for the success of its mission. He became the Finance Member of the Viceroy’s Executive Council in 1946 and the first Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1947. Scrupulously honest, he refused to accept property in Pakistan in exchange for his land holdings in India, and after his death, his son and his wife, a Christian, Ranana Sheila Irene Pant, had to live in a house donated by the government.

This work projects Liaquat Ali Khan as a mild, well-meaning man of moderate disposition who shunned controversies. Mediocre in intellect, his sincerity of purpose and dedication made it easier for him to inspire confidence among his party workers. This work shows how the Muslims felt threatened by Hindu majoritarianism and feared that the Federation as envisaged under the Government of India Act (1935) would complete their disaster.

By mobilising the Muslim mass support, Jinnah widened his political base to fight the Congress. One is tempted to conclude from this work that the Congress was outmanoeuvred by Jinnah’s brilliant strategy and leadership, and Liaquat Ali Khan’s famous budget speech on February 28, 1947, in the Legislative Assembly, which hit the business magnets supporting the Congress, turned the tide in the Congress in favour of Partition. On March 3, 1947, Khizar Hayat Khan was forced to resign as Chief Minister due to Muslim League pressure, and the way was clear for the creation of Pakistan.

By 1945, the Muslim League succeeded in setting up its party ministry in four of the provinces, and in the fifth, it held a strong position by putting pressure on the dispirited and shrinking Unionists party

Professor Roger D. Long with a foreword by Stanely Wolpert. Oxford University Press, Karachi. Pages 328. V.N. Datta

This fantastic transformation of the Muslim League would not be possible without Liaqat Ali Khan–the forgotten hero of Pakistan. Today PTV does not show the Liaqat fist, and there is no national holiday for this hero. All this is based on pre-independence politics when Liaqat rubbed many the wrong way. It had not, there would have been no Pakistan.

By Moin Ansari

The Singh Doctrine for Akhand Bharat Fails

Gandhi’s racism: Crititicsm of Mohandas Gandhi by his grandsons and other Indians

Why is Urine drinking popular in India? From Mohandas Gandhi to PM Desai to common man.

How Buddhism was exterminated from South Asia? 600BC-400AD Reviving Hindusism in Budhdist lands: The Hindu extremists use the Safron Swastika flag instead of the tri-colored flag of India. (see Hindu unity dot org)

Indian penury: The reality vs. the Bollywood marketing gloss:

India as World Power 1 Extremist Hindus show power using the Swastika in triple entendre–as an ancient Hindu symbol, reverence for Hitler and sign of Anti-Western Indian power

Superpower India Pt 2

Extremist Hindus revere Hitler and use the Swastika as the Indian flag

How long to extripate penury from india? 300 years! India’s budget– fit for a superpower Murder of 10 million Indian girl babies:Before or right after birth. The media is silent.
————————————–
Sino-Indian relationship

India Balkanizing? Naxalite insurrection widening cracks in deep cavaties
The 2nd world revolution (after Buddhism) from Nepal: Another threat to India

Red Nepal: Clear and present danger to India

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