Kargil: Separating fact from fiction a decade later
by Moin Ansari, July 16th, 2009
| NEW YORK | RUPEE NEWS | Copyrighted Materia l. All Rights Reserved | July 16th, 2009 | Moin Ansari |:-Kargil was Pakistani territory before 1971, and there is documented proof of this from international sources, from Japan and other countries (which had sent climbers to the area and had to get Pakistan’s permission). Bharat had the gall to call this an incursion when she herself had occupied the territory. And this was the Cease Fire line. Bharat has the gumption to call this an incursion when it sent thousands of Bharti soldiers across the border under the banner of the Mukti Bahni, and has been sending terrorists into Swat and FATA under the umbrella of the TTP. Delhi has done the same with Bangladesh, when it tried to rule the country under the Rakhi Bahni, and she did the same in Nepal. Her despicable role in Sri Lankais also known to the planet. The death of the Indian agent Parphakhan was a victory for freedom everywhere. Bharat has also tried to destabilize China in Tibet and more recently in Xinjiang.
Every day, some nincompoop comes up with a new story about the so called “victory” in Kargil. The brave soldiers of the Pakistan has have exemplified thier guts through blood sweat and tears. They found the Bharti army lacking in strength, courage, stamina, tactics, and strategy. They were caught napping. taking over 300 peaks is no man feat. The brave jawans of the Pakistan did it. It is these soldiers that keep the agressors away.
The peaks and caves of the Himalayas hide many secrets. Kargil cannot be explained in one line or a paragraph. The secret history of Kargil is shrouded in tactical, laconic and incommunicative Pakistani silence, deliberate Indian obfuscation and nonsensical banal Bollywood bluster.
The Pakistani military in professional terms ranks among the best in the world, along with the Indian army according to Col. Puri. The implicit irony here is that India is fives times larger than Pakistan. For Islamabad to create this balance of power in just five decades is a Pakistani achievement. Indian Army Col. Puri
The facts are lost because of the sensitive nature of the operation, the reticence of commandos to discuss it, the as well as the army tactiturn not to address the issues which may impact current or future operations. Let us look into the seeds of time, and decouple the story from history andbring out the truth.
- Indian Top Secret Kargil Tapes: The impact of releasing them
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“We Shouldn’t Have Given The Secret Kargil Tapes To Pakistan”:Vajpayee’s handing over the Musharraf tape to Nawaz Sharif was an intelligence disaster
Kargil:When Five Kashmiri-Pakistani battalions overcame four Indian Division and captured more than 300 peaks–deep into Indian occupied Kashmiri territory. Kargi: When the USA, Western Europe, Israel, and India forced the status quo to remain.
For obvious and partisan reasons the Pakistanis have not been forthright about the American and Israeli involvement in Kargil. However there is enough evidence to findthe kernels of truth. Recently during his trip to India, Mr. Olmert the Israeli Prime Minister publicly reminded Indians and the world on the valuable assistance Israel had provided to to India during Kargil. What help could have Israel have provided? Satellite pictures, drones, AWAC surveillance andhigh altitude aviation are some of the areas that would have helped India.
The Kargil episode was like the 1973 Ramadhan War between Egypt and Israel–by crossing the Suez Canal and destroying the Bar Lev Lines the Egyptians forced the Americans to paint the Star of David on their F-16s and bomb the Egyptian forces. It thus showed the world that the invincibility of the Israeli soldier was a myth…and they sued for peace.
During the Kargil War in 1999, India received from Israel unmanned aerial vehicles, laser-guided bombs and other hardware to knock out Pakistani hilltop bunkers. Israel’s support helped India appreciate its sophisticated electronics and weapons systems. Salem News. Israel’s Military Supplies to India, By Hari Special to Salem-News.com
Kargil also announced to the planet that India from that day forward can never cross the international border ever!
The world accepted Siachin, but did not accept Kargil (which was Siachin in reverse). According to General Pervez Musharraf, the architect of the operation, Kargil was a preventative action which stopped Indian incursions into Pakistani Kashmir. It was a success in every way.
There is a lot of junk out there on Kargil. Many are exposed to the Bharti point of view. Here is a an unbiased perspective. Bollywood has come up with all sorts of yarns and Mr. Nawaz Sharif has used Kargil for political advancement and to gain sympathy from the Americans and his friends across the border Mr. Vajpayee. Mr. Sharif’s current book “Ghaddar Kaoun” is actually an apology for himself and a justification for horrid propaganda from across the border–which is being periodically released in small poison pill dosages. Kargil: Sharif’s policy of plausible deniability exposes lies.
Mr. Sharif lied to President Clinton and even to Prime Minister Vaypayee. Mr. Sharif went to the extent of handing over edited but taped conversaitons between Pakistani commanders to the Indians. After the coup Mr. Sharif and his son were in touch with the Indians.
Mr. Sharif has lied about Kargil. Mr. Sharif has denied that he was even aware of Kargil. Mr. Shairf should have waited for a few more weeks, and there would have been no Kashmir problem to solve. At some juncture, he ran to White House
Let us look at the Line of Control and dig a bit deeper. Kargil is intricately tied to Siachin. Here are some maps of Siachin, Kashmir and Kargil. These maps show the Kashmir region, the Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir in three folios.
Kargil cannot be explained in a soundbite. Let us look into the seeds of time, and decouple story from history and bring out the Pakistani narrative. Let us begin the story of Kargil by describing the story of Siachin first
Siachin was “India’s Kargil operation“. India’s incursion was allowed to stand, and Pakistani’soperation was not allowed to stand.
Who does Siachin belong to? It was Pakistani territory right up to the 80s when Indian forces snuck in. The fact that the Siachen Glaciers were under de-facto control of Pakistan, was even recognised by the Indians and also by the International community. Even after the Simla agreement, the international alpinerswere taking Pakistan’s permission for their mountaineering expeditions. It is a long list, but some of the teams include:-
1. 1974- Japanese Kwoto university- Karakoram mission to conquer K-2 at the heights of 74680 meters.
2. 1975-UK North-West Karakoram Expedition- To conquer Sherbi Kangri at height of 23960 feet.
3. 1976- German KK Himalaya Expedition- For Salotre Kangri at 77060 Meters.
4. 1978- Japanese Kojo Alpine KK Expedition- Terim Glaciers at 6476 Meters.
5. 1980- Mr. Glen Roel-USA KK skating and tracking party-Lofound Glaciers.
6. 1984-Austrian Arex Expedition for K-12; were given permission effective for June , but Indians landed forces in April 1984.
In taking over Siachin, India was in total violation of all international agreements as well as Simla.
Simla like Versailles was signed under duress, when the dice was heavily loaded against Pakistan. The Indians who took the lead to violate their own agreement. The most relevant clauses of the Simla agreement are:-
Article 1(ii) of the Simla Agreementstates: Pending the final settlement of any problem between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and both sidesshallprevent organisation, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations.
Article 4(ii) states: The Line of Control shall be respected by both sides and both sides shall refrain from threats or use of force in violation of this line.
In 1972, soon after signing the Simla Agreement, India transgressed in the Chorbatal area. In 1984, when Pakistan was busy in the Afghan war, India occupied the Siachin Glaciers in complete violation of the Simla Agreement. In 1988, the Qamar sector was seized. Since 1996, India is using the artillery fire to interdict the road running through the Neelam valley. In May 1999, the Indians made an abortive attempt to occupy the Shyocksector on the Pakistan sideof the Cease Fire Line.
Retaking Kargil. Kargil used to be under Pakistani control also. Kargil was not agression. the peaks of Kargilwere under Pakistani control to begin with.
The truth about Kargil is hidden under Pakistani secrecy laws andthe politicization of the event–both in India andPakistan makes it very difficult to get to the truth. The situation has gotten worsebecause some of the naive and appeasing Pakistanis who seem to think, that if we forget Kashmir, all problems will end, and India will give up its support for Balauchistan, Pakhtunsitan, Sindhu Desh, and Akhand Bharat. Some of thesedefeatist Pakistanis are under the illusion that if we forget Kashmir they will forget their desire to extend “Bharat” from Kabul to Raj Kilhani East of Bali. These “Pakistanis” seem to think that if we forget Kashmir, they will withdraw from Saichin, andSir Creek. This “Fifth Column” amongst us thinks that if we forget Kashmir, they will immediately liberate the 150 million Muslims in India. These enemies of Pakistan seem to think that if we forget Kashmir the unemployment, discrimination, andactual genocide of Muslims in India will evaporate. These traitors forget that if if we don’t draw a red-line on Kashmir, they will stop our water, starve us, and then treat us like the 250 million untouchable Dalits of India. Even in the USA some Hindus do not allow Muslims to touch their food even if they are friends.
At the strategic level, besides embarrassing India, Pakistan’s aim was to internationalise the Kashmir issue, as it was losing its grip in the valley and had to do something sensational to bring the issue to international centre stage. Pakistan perceived that the political situation in India was fragile and in such an environment the Indian polity would not have the stomach to retaliate to any aggressive designs. Militarily, Pakistan selected areas for the intrusions which would offer minimum resistance and where they could exploit the large gaps in the defences. Also by launching such an operation, Pakistan aimed to secure maximum territory for strategic and tactical gains, change the status of the Line of Control (LoC), revive insurgency in the valley and elsewhere in J&K as well as isolate Ladakhfrom Srinagar. It was a highly ambitious plan andsince it surprised the Indian Army, it was tremendously successful.
The Indians have had a tough time spinning the defeat anddeveloping a story that disguises their failed policies in Kashmir. Part of the problem with this operation is that some of the issues are hidden in the partisan politics of Pakistan. Let us try to narrate the facts about Kargil.
In response to the partisan carping by General (Retd) Talat Masood, General Ali Hamid says the following:
Those who criticize Kargil never attempted to analyze the operation from a politico-military perspective. It was a limited operation – more so a border conflict – designed to achieve strategic effects. Limited operations have a planning and operational dynamic of their own and cannot be approached in a manner in which a general war is planned and executed. Major-General (retd) Syed Ali Hamid
The truth about Kargil cannot be inunciatedin a soundbite. The entire complex background of Kashmir has to described in detail.
0) Kashmir does not belong to India. India occupied it by showing a forged article of accession which was never submitted to the UNO or to Pakistan. India claims that the original article of accession is now lost. The dates even on the forged article of accession are all wrong. Stanley Wolpert and Alistair Lamb have written extensively about the discrepencies. Azad Kashmir revolted against the Raja of Kashmir, so he did not have any right to sign over any territory which was not under his control.
00) Northern Areas were not part of Kashmir. Gilgit Skarduvoted with their feet to join Pakistan andsigned the articles of accession to Pakistan. Many foreign maps show Northern Areas as part of Kashmir. Nothing is farther from the truth. President Zia ul Haq absorbed the Northern Areas into Pakistan and they are as much a part of the Pakistani Federation as the Punjab or Sindh.
000) Foreign news agencies should be informed as follows: Only Azad Kashmir is the area that should be labeled “Pakistani administered Kashmir.” Northern Areas are not “Kashmir”, they are part of Pakistan.
1) First of all it needs to be pointed out that Kargilwas under Pakistani control for about 40 years after independence. After the aftermath of 1971 it was illegally taken over by India.
2) The same applies for Siachin. Siachin was under Pakistani control. This has been discussed in a separate article.
3) Indian forces snuckover the Cease Fire Line and captured Siachinwhen Pakistan was busy fighting the war in Afghanistan. The world was quiet. The silence is deafening. The world allowed India to take over more Kashmir because many in the West do not want the Chinese to have land access to the Arabian Sea. This is not personal, only geo-political. India wants to cut off Pakistan’s link to China.
4) Let us look at the historical perspective on Kashmir. India has few access points to Kashmir. One of the most important ones is through East Punjab. Gurdaspur was a Muslim majority area in East Punjab. it was a strategic point of access to Kashmir. Without Gurdaspur, Indian and British forces could not get to Srinagar as they did later to force the Maharaja out ofoffice with a forged article of accession.There were four districts in Gurdaspur. Three were Muslim Majority areas and should have been given to Pakistan. Lord Radcliff after receiving 6 corore Rupees from Birla and other Hinuvata businessmen who had also created the marketing image of Mr. Gandhi. This bribe influenced Mr. Radcliff from demarcating the border which takes reversal convulsions in East Punjab. In one of the most blatant and heinous crimes in modern history, the Muslim majority areas of Gurdaspur were handed over to the republic of India.
5) In the 80s the geography had not changed. Gurdaspurremained a choke point for India. With the Khalistani insurrection raging uncontrollably, the Indian supply lines from Gurdaspur were in jeopardy, and India could not count on sending its troops via rail or road to Kashmir without being harassed by Sikh nationalists and Kashmiri separatists. A raging insurgency in East Punjab deprived India of effectively controlling Kashmir.
5) APPEASING INDIA ON KASHMIR: Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto understood all of this. Ms. Bhutto did not have a clue. Ms. Benazir Bhutto came to power and wheeled and dealed with Mr. Rajiv Gandhi on Sichain for East Punjab. The deal confirmed by many Indian authors lately has been described as follows. Pakistan would stop all support for Khalistan in return for Indian withdrawal from Siachin. Mr. Ahtizaz Ahsan handed over a list of all Khalistani freedom fighters to India. In one night the entire leadership and cadre of the Khalistan movement was extinguished. A massive crackdown across India led to the denouement of the movement that would have deprived Gurdaspur to India–and therefore Kashmir.
5) During Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Pakistan, the sign in front of Kashmri House was removed, the name of Kashmir Road was painted over to hide it, and the maps of Pakistan were changed on PTV not to show Kahsmir as part of Pakistan.
6) RajivGandhi either hoodwinked Ms. Bhutto, or reneged on the deal or could not deliver on his promise. In either case the denouement of the Khalistan movement caused irreparable damage to Pakistan and the Kashmir. This was the main reason for the removal of Ms. Bhutto from power. She was a security risk and was henceforward prohibited from visiting the nuclear facilities of Pakistan.
6) Pakistan wanted to pay back India for Siachin and re-take Kargil which used to be under Pakistani control for decades.
7) An operation was planned to put pressure on India to withdraw from Siachin.
8) The Pakistanis had been seething since Saichin. They were also planning to unseat Indian from Siachin and not accept any more status quos. General Pervez Musharraf in book mentions India’s intentions of preparing for an attack since 1998 and that Pakistan’s Kargiloperations were merely defensive in nature. The timing of the intrusion did not coincided with Mr. Vajpayee’s vist it at all.
General Karamat was opposed to the Kargil operation. He was removed and General Musharraf was appointed as the COAS of the Pakistan Army. It was a well known fact that General Musharraf was ready to spearhead the Kargil operation that had been planned by the army and also presented to Benazir Bhutto.Some of earliest intrusions had occurred as early as Dec 1998. It was an ongoing operation so some of the stocks recovered later only represented the only the tail end of the operation in Feb/early Mar timeframe.
9) General Pervez Musharraf, no matter what you think of him as a politician is a brilliant commando and great strategist. He planned the entire Kargil program and was able to take over 300 peaks in the Kargil sector during the dead of winter where even winds avoid the area. This was one of the most difficult terrains on the planet where only seasoned mountaineers andmountain climbers can trek under the best of conditions. Moving entire battalions across the high altitude passes and capture the peaks was probably the most brilliant maneuvers in the history of mountain warfare.
10) With all their satellite technology, and drones, Kargil was a massive failure of Indian, American, and Israeli intelligence. The Indian did not have a clue about the encroachment of Pakistani forces which had been undertaken to re-take peaks that were previously under Pakistani control for decades anyway. The Indian posts were not manned during winter and had been abandoned.
Indian Military intelligence has limited depth in picking up information and much is left to other intelligence agencies for acquisition of information. During the operations air photos were supplied to us by Research and Analysis Wing but there was a total mismatch in the interpretation of the air photos with the maps mainly due to difference in the scales with the result we could not with accuracy locate the information available on the photos. Intelligence was a total failure. There was no worthwhile information coming our way and we were totally dependent on the troops in contact
11) With great care, one peak after the other was taken. Once a peak was secured, arms and supplies were sent to the peak. Cell or satellite phone were not used, so as not to alert the Indian, America and Israeli ears in the area.
12) Inevitable, but quiet by accident the Indians discovered that one of the peaks that it wanted to return to could not be accessed as it was occupied by the Pakistani crescent and Star forces.
The terrain in which the operations were conducted was rugged with precipitous slopes and heights varying from 18000-21000 ft. The inhospitable and daunting terrain took a heavy toll of men andmaterial. The extreme high altitude made breathing difficult and movement sapped one’s energy. Our initial failure to evict the intrusions could well be attributed to lack of acclimatization of the troops. Ladakh was served from Srinagar by the highway to Leh which remained closed from end Nov till May due to heavy snow. The road was used during fair weather period for the logistic stocking for the military garrison and the local population of Leh which was indeed a Herculean task. It was on the heights dominating the highway that Pakistan infiltrators intruded and began to effectively interdict movement on the main road axis to Leh. The timing of the intrusion has been hotly debated in the media and in military circles.
13) The Indians did not know what had hit them. Teams were sent to Washington, Tel Aviv, and all European capitals complaining about the Pakistani encroachment.
14) The Indians initially tried to re-capture the peaks. They failed miserably. They were unable to climb the mountaintops. They panicked. They asked for help from Israel. A massive flow of weapons, materials and forces were sent to New Delhi. A satellite was repositioned to focus on Kargil. American reconnaissance toys were deployed in Kargil. In the 1973 Ramadhan war, when Israel faced imminent defeat andpossible annihilation. American F-16s were painted with the Star of David and ran bombing missions on Egypt’s 3rd army. A similar feature awaited Pakistan.
15) If Pakistan had held out for about 3 more weeks, the snows would have prevented India from retaking the peaks.
16) Pakistan was a nuclear power, and India knew it. This was a golden opportunity for Pakistan. Therefore crossing the international border was not an option. All Pakistan had to do was to wait out about 3 weeks and that would have sealed the fate of Kargil, Drass, and would have forced India to withdraw from Siachin.
17) India, America and Israel realized that they could not inflict a military victory in Kargil. The only option left was political pressure. Unfortunately for Pakistan, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, Mr. Shahbaz Sharif and Abbajee ran the government in Islamabad. Mr. Nawaz Sharifwas under tremendous pressure from America to withdraw. Within a few days, the whispers out of the White House turned into a crescendo from world capitals.
18) Mr. Nawaz Sharif’s tube light was off. Under normal conditions it takes a tube light some time to come on. It flickers and waits, and then finally comes to full luminescence. For Mr. Nawaz Shiar, the tube light sometimes fails to come on at all. Most of the time it flickers and comes on after a long time. Mr. Sharif at the time of Kargillwanted to make some lucrative deals with India to help his friends in the industrial sector.
19) Mr. Sharif had the option to believing his chief of staff, General PervezMusharraf, or believing his friend and business partner Mr. Vajpayee. He had an option to take the entire matter to the National Assembly or build national consensus on this or resolve it without the parliament andmake a decision with his kitchen cabinet.
20) Mr. Sharif the frightened funk failed to see the long term consequences of his actions. He ran to Washington and surrendered what the Pakistan army had won on the battle field. Mr. Clinton humiliated him by calling the Indian Prime Minister before, during andafter the meeting which was not even held in the White House.
21) It wasn’t just General PervezMusharraf, but the entire army the nation that was livid with Mr. Sharif.
The United Jihad Council was the primary public voice of the Mujahideen in the Kargiloffensive. Pakistan backed the guerrillas in a bid to change the cease-fire line through the territory. The United Jihad Council, including four fighting in the Kargilmountains, said the guerrillas would not leave the area becauseit is their homeland. The Pakistani government pullback of its troops and allied Kashmiri secessionist and Taliban fighters from the Kargil-Dass-Batalik region of Indian-held Kashmir in July 1999 caused considerable criticism of the Pakistani government, and contributed to the military coup of October 1999.
22) The removal of Mr. Shairf was welcomed not in the army, but in all quarters in Pakistan.
23) The rest is all Bollywood nonsense.
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Appendix 1 Kargil: The Real Truth
There are two ‘truths’ about Kargil. The first one is the version of defeatist Pakistanis who can’t see us By AHMED QURAISHI Tuesday, 20 May 2008. WWW.AHMEDQURAISHI.COM
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan-There are two ‘stories’ about Kargil. The first one is the version of defeatist Pakistanis who can’t see us doing any good. This is the Indian line. The secondstory is the truth.
Surprisingly, some fair minded former Indian army officers are willing to give a balanced verdict on the Pakistani performance in Kargil than the ridiculous assessments of some defeatist andself-hating Pakistanis who have no problem making fun of their homeland andtheir military just because they differ politicallywith Gen. Pervez Musharraf.
I would like to give some of these defeatist Pakistanis a shock: The revealing statement to a Pakistani newspaper, The News, of an Indian army officer having something good to say about the Pakistani military capability as demonstrated in Kargilin 1999. Some of the defeatist, self-hating Pakistanis will find this difficult to swallow since they are more accustomed to criticizing Pakistan, not praising it.
Read the letter below by retired Col. Harish Purifrom the Indian army’s Corps of Signals. He uses many of the Indian propaganda lines that raise doubts about the end result of the Pakistani operation, how the Indian people came together in those days to support their military, andhow Islamabad underestimated the Indian response.
All propaganda points. But then he makes two points very clear that I wish some of those self-hating defeatist Pakistanis, especially the ones in our English-language liberal newspapers, read and feel some shame – just a little – about how they have been putting Pakistan downwhenever discussing Kargil andfacilitating the propaganda victory of the other side.
The two points that Col. Puri makes are:
It is correct to praise the brilliance of the Pakistani tactical maneuver of stealthily occupying the heights and the massive Indian intelligence failure exploited by the Pakistani military.
The Pakistani military in professional terms ranks among the best in the world, along with the Indian army according to Col. Puri. The implicit irony here is that India is fives times larger than Pakistan. For Islamabad to create this balance of power in just five decades is a Pakistani achievement.
This is not about clearing the name of Gen. Musharraf. History, and military analysts, will do that. Our job here is just to tell those few, self-bashing, defeatist-minded Pakistanis this: Please spare us your self-hatred. We are good at anything we want to be good at if we put our mind into it. Celebrate your strength instead of wallowing in your weaknesses. Kargil – nine years later Letters to the editor, The News International, Karachi. Sunday, May 18, 2008
This is in reference to an article “Kargil- none years on” by Brigadier Sher Khan published in your newspaper on May 6. It was an absorbing article which transported me back to my days in the Indian army, and that particular conflict. My reflections, nine years on, focus on the utter futility of the whole exercize- it doesn’t matter which side you’re on, a soldier’s life is always precious, and sadly, expendable as well.You’re right about the brilliance of the tactical manoeuvre of occupying the heights so stealthily, and about the massive intelligence failure on our part.
But the The Pakistan army underestimated both the ferocity of the Indian reaction as well as the resolve of the Indian nation – never have I seen an entire population come together as one nation as in those days. That was heady stuff – a young Capt Vikram Batra declaring “Yeh dil maange more” only to lose his life the next day. And the bravado of Capt Kamal Sher Khan is the stuff legends are made of. But, in the ultimate analysis, to what end?War is too dangerous a game to be left to generals alone. Fortunately in
India, the civilians call the shots, and Vajpayee’s conscious decision not to allow his troops to cross the LoCwasamajorfactor for India ’s gaining the high moral ground. But let us as army men salute the spirit of the soldiers on bothsides- professionally, both our armies rank among the best in the world. (retd) Harish PuriIndian Army (Corps of Signals),
http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=113286
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Appendix 2
LoC-Line of Control
Columnist Wing Comd (Retd) MUHAMMAD IRSHAD discusses the various aspects of the LoC dividing KASHMIR
Line of Control has always been the bone of contention between India and Pakistan. Some call it a geographical necessity. Some call it a political blunder. The entire stretch of the Line of Control between the Indian held Kashmir and the areas of the state under PakistanÕs controlÑ known as Azad Kashmir is a soldierÕs nightmare. The LoC in the Indian territory resembles thousands of ÔCheck Point CharlieÕ at the Berlin Wall during the Cold War. The 800-km curved line does not follow any well defined geographical feature andoften a house has its courtyard in India and other rooms in Pakistan. For the last 50 years, the two armies have been in an eye ball to eye ball confrontation. In this situation, border skirmishes and firing are the order, andpeaceis a rare interlude. Since five decades the best brains and resources of boththecountries have been kept engaged by this line which boththe nations consider it to be only temporary. To understand the history and geography of this line, we must first talk of one of parting kick given by the British Lord Mountbatten from his long list of Òhate MuslimsÓ.
The British having ruled the sub-continent for so long, were naturally reluctant to pull out; but when they found it totally inevitable; they started playing against their own defined rules. One such victim was the town of
Gurdaspur, located near our Sialkot borders. As per the defined formula, andthelater plebiscite, this town was to be the part of Pakistan. So when plebiscite results were declared Muslims also considered the valley of Kashmir (already having 77% Muslims but ruled by a Hindu) as to be a natural part of Pakistan. For Indians the occupation of this town was extremely important, becauseall road links with Kashmir were only through this town.
The future Indian Prime Minister Nehru, extremely cunning andfamousforall kinds of treacheries, had other plans. His links with the British Lord MountbattenÕs wife were no secret, and his qualities of deception anddoubletalkwere equally famous. So the underground politics worked and only few days before the announcement of Independent Pakistan by Quaid-e-Azam, Mountbatten announced the accession of Gurdaspur with India, and only minutes later the Indian Army moved-in to capture the important posts of the town.
It was kept so secret that even Quaid-e-Azam was not aware of it till the time, Indians had actually taken full control of it. But the subsequent news certainly annoyed him. It was against the defined rules, it was against the ethics, andit was definitely a caseofbetrayal of the Muslim cause. (Andrew Roberts in his book entitled “Lord Mountbatten’s Deceit”) writes
Just as Ferozepur and Zira had gone to India despite their Muslim majority, so three out of the four tehsils of the Gurdaspur district north of Amritsar were also awarded to India, despite the fact that two of them had significant Muslim majorities. Ferozepur had an arsenal, but Gurdaspur had something just as valuable: the road from India to Kashmir. In this casethe”other factor” was that only with Gurdaspur in India would there be a direct road between India andthe landofNehruÕs birth.
. . . . . . .. . . . . .saw the Indian corridor to Kashmir via Muslim Gurdaspur as Mountbatten’s “parting kick” to Pakistan. Mountbatten well understood the strategic implications, and told the Nawab of Bhopal on 4 August, that Kashmir was Ôso placed geographically that it could join either Dominion, provided part of Gurdaspur were put into East Punjab by the Boundary Commission”. If gerrymandering took place in case of Ferozepur, it is not too hard to believe that Mountbatten also pressurised Radcliffe to ensure that Gurdaspur wound up in India. The circumstantial evidence is once again overwhelming. As Alaistar Lamb has stated, “The essential access for India along the road was made possible by the Award of the three tehsils to India despite the Muslim majorities.”
As per the plebiscite formula, Kashmir , with more than 77% Muslim population was to be the part of Pakistan. The Mahraja of Kashmir, Hari Singh Dogra, was initially trying to preserve the integrity of Kashmir, andtherefore did not accede to either dominion. But immediately after the announcement of Gurdaspur, he physically positioned himself in the Indian capital.
Quaid-e-Azam, the kind of legal man he was, did try to talk much of the legality, but no one listened to him. The things in general, for the infant state of Pakistan were extremely bad. The British were bent upon giving every carrot to Mr. Nehru and every stick was reserved for Jinnah. The Hindu mentality (which just showed us some glimpses in the massacre of Babri Mosque and invasion of SikhsÕ Golden Temple) was at its worst. Thus the Hindus were doing everything possible on earthtomakelife miserable for Muslims as well as for the new state of Pakistan. Many Hindu leaders had openly expressed faith that the new state within days will be begging for joining them back. The Muslim areas of Ferozepur andZirawereforcibly occupied by Hindus, because they contained a big Army ammunition depot.
The Hindus not only raped and butchered every possible Pakistani, but also refused to give the PakistanÕs share of money and arms. Thus initially for many weeks, Pakistan had no money to even pay to its government employees, and even the army was consisting of some loyalist with negligible arms.
In those difficult times, Quaid-e-Azam, was given the news that Indian army has moved in Kashmir also. The fate of many areas occupied in a similar manner was very well-known to him.
“The key to understanding Mountbatten’s stance over Kashmir, which like Hyderabad had not acceded to either Dominion before Independence Day, was his anti-Pakistan bias. Ian Steven’s, editor of the English-language Indian paper The Statesman, dined withtheMountbatten on 26 October, 1947. A few days earlier Pathantribesmen, believed to be supported by Pakistan, had attacked western Kashmir. At dinner with the Mountbatten, Steven’s was “startled by their one-sided verdict on affairs” andthoughtthat they had both “become wholly pro-Hindu“.
Mountbatten claimed India’s policy towards Kashmir was “impeccable“. In fact, it is now known that Indian troops had moved into Kashmir before the tribesmen had crossed the border. A full scale airborne Indian invasion was under way the morning after the dinner with Steven’s, and three million Muslims in a vital region were forced to become Indian citizens against their will. Four out of five Kashmiris were Muslim, andinpermitting India to invade and subsequently annex Kashmir-albeit whilst promising plebiscites there at a later stage Mountbatten went back on the whole concept of his 3rd of June Plan of Partitioning the subcontinent into areas according to religion. The plebiscites were never held. ” (Excerpts “Lord Mountbatten’s Deceit” by Andrew Roberts)
Withnegligible resources, but with a show of tremendous courage, Quaid-e-Azam, decided to take a decision, which only his foresight could foretell. He decided to send his troops in Kashmir to face the Indian army, and avoid what had happened in Ferozepur, Gurdaspur and at many other places. But the man who controlled the heart-beats of millions of Muslims, got his first shock, when his own appointed, the British Chief of Pakistan Army, General Messervyrefused to attack, calling it “mere suicide”. But the very strong man insidethe thin bone structure, did not stop there. He convinced the tribal leader to send the volunteers, who obliged and thus the tribal lashkar crossed over the bridge on river Jhelum on 22nd October 1947.
Indians had strong regular army with plentyofammunition, they also moved in very fast (their British Commander-in- Chief of Indian Army Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, did not refuse Nehru). On 26th October 1947, the Indian army halted the tribal lashkar outsideSrinagar. This war with some gaps continued for about 14 months, and was stopped at the intervention of UN on January 1, 1949. Both, India and Pakistan signed the ceasefire pact in Karachi on 27th July 1949, and this pact came to be known as “Karachi Pact” or “Ceasefire Pact”. This pact apart from other details of area occupation, for the first time defined this line as CFL(Ceasefire Line). This pact was signed by the military representatives of both the countries, andasaresult UN observers were placed on both sides of the line.
In the demarcation of the CFL line, the extreme point to be considered was in Baltistan, valley of Shyok-river, point NJ 980420. From there on about a 75-Km stretch of snowy land leading up to the Chinese border was not demarcated for two reasons.
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a) The area beyond the line consisted of glaciers, which were extremely difficult to map.
b) In the 14-month war, no fighting had taken place between the two countries in that area, and it was presumed that because of extreme weather, no fighting shall take place till the final settlement.
Following three paragraphs related to the CFL line, particularly need a mention.
Para 2(d): “Chotbatal(Pt 15700) Chulunka (on the Shyok river Khor) then north to the glaciers. This portion of the CFL shall be demarcated in detail on the basis of the factual position as of 27th July 1949 by the local commanders, assisted by UN military observers.”
Para 2(c): The CFL described above shall be drawn on a one inch map (where available) andthen verified mutually on groundbythelocal commanders on each side with the assistance of the military observers, so as to eliminate any no man’s land. In the event that the local commanders are unable to reach an agreement, the matter shall be referred to the commissionÕs military advisers, whose decision shall be final. After this verification, the military advisers will issue to each high command a map on which will be marked the definite ceasefire line.
Para(6)-b(i): The basic document which determines the exact location of the CFL is the original map which was drawn during the demarcation of the line by opposing army representatives, and UN observers and approved by UNCIP’s Military advisers. This map is in the custody of the chief Military Observer.
Para(6)-b(ii): The descriptive narrative in the Karachi agreement serves only as a general guide when CFL positions are under considerations.
North of the line were Siachen Glaciers, which were traditionally always considered to be a part of Pakistan. This de-facto control of Pakistan was recognised internationally, and almost all the mountaineering teams which came to study the Siachen Glaciers and related areas took permission from Pakistan. Some of these teams included (Courtesy: Siachen Glacier By Col Muhammad Zakir):-
In 1957, the mountaineering team of Royal Imperial College, led by Mr. Eric Shipton, came to study the Siachen glaciers, Rimo glacier and K-12 peak.
Between 1961 and 1962, two Australian teams conquered the peaks of Sia-kangri.
Between 1961 and 1962, three Japenese teams went to Siachen glaciers, included in these teams was Pakistan-Japan Soltoro Expedition, for the very first time conquered the Soltoro Kangripeaks. Included in this expedition was Kyoto Alpine Club of Japan, with two Pakistanis, Raja Bashir and Pervez A Khan.
Because of Pakistan’s control over this area, on 2nd March 1963, Pakistan and China signed for adjustment and clear demarcation of their borders near the Siachen glaciers. Indians did lodge a protest in UN against this agreement, but nowhere they ever challenged the de-facto control of Pakistan over this area. An extract of the Indian words are reproduced below:-
“According to a communique issued by the government of Pakistan on 3rd May 1962, the Government of Pakistan and China have agreed to enter into negotiations to locate and mark the position of the boundary between India and China , west of Karakoram Passwhichis presently under Pakistan’s unlawful occupation.”These words are confirming Pakistan’s control on area till Karakoram Pass which is much north of Siachen Glaciers.
During 1965 war, bothcountriesoccupied some areas of opposing countries, but in accordance with the “Tashkent Peace Accord”, returned almost to the pre-war positions, thus the Line of control virtually remained unchanged.
1971 was probably the worst year in Pakistan’s history. It was a year in which we faced a debacle of unimaginable proportion, matched by the total collapseofthepolitical leadership. The massive blunders resulted in direct Indian landings to slice us into two parts, with India holding our 93,000 Pakistani Prisoners of War and a huge tract of land in the then known as West Pakistan. The nascent Pakistan economy was in a shambles and for all our self-righteous posturing in the global arena Pakistan stood cruelly isolated, its international prestige savaged. Under those circumstances, our Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto went to sign the peace agreement, now known as ÒSimla AgreementÓ.
India insisted on many changes along the Ceasefire Line and even its status was changed to what it is now called “The Line of Control”. With some changes, now this line of control is defined as “the east-west line demarcated through Kashmir where Indian and Pakistani troops were positioned when a ceasefire was called to end hostilities between India and Pakistan on December 17, 1971″.
When the Simla Agreement was signed on July 2, 1972, this line separated the one-third of Kashmir occupied by Pakistan from the two-thirds of Kashmir occupied by India. Field commanders from bothsides, along withaUN representative, went through the actual groundpositions of the two sets of troops with a fine-toothed comb andonDecember11, 1972, a set of 25 maps were exchanged by both sides and signed to agree and ratify the Line of Control (LoC). However the defining posts at some places are many kilometers apart, creating a sort of “loosening” in demarcation, which is a major cause of regular flare-up between the two countries.
That the Siachen Glaciers were under de-facto control of Pakistan, was even recognised by the Indians and also by the International community, even after the Simlaagreement, as they were taking Pakistan’s permission for their mountaineering expeditions. It is a long list, but some of the teams include:-
1. 1974- Japanese Kwoto university- Karakoram mission to conquer K-2 at the heights of 74680 meters.
2. 1975-UK North-West Karakoram Expedition- To conquer Sherbi Kangri at height of 23960 feet.
3. 1976- German KK Himalaya Expedition- For Salotre Kangri at 77060 Meters.
4. 1978- Japanese Kojo Alpine KK Expedition- Terim Glaciers at 6476 Meters.
5. 1980- Mr. Glen Roel-USA KK skating and tracking party-Lofound Glaciers.
6. 1984-Austrian Arex Expedition for K-12; were given permission effective for June , but Indians landed forces in April 1984.
Although Simla Agreement was signed, when the dice was heavily loaded against Pakistan, still it were the Indians who took lead to violate their own signatures. Two relevant clauses of the Simla agreement are:-
Article 1(ii) of the SimlaAgreementstates: Pending the final settlement of any problem between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation and bothsidesshallprevent organisation, assistance or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and harmonious relations.
Article 4(ii) states: The Line of Control shall be respected by both sides and both sides shall refrain from threats or use of force in violation of this line.
In 1972, soon after signing the Simla Agreement, India transgressed in the Chorbatal area. In 1984, it occupied the Siachin GlacierÕs in complete violation of the Simla Agreement. In 1988, the Qamar sector was seized. Since 1996, India is using the artillery fire to interdict the road running through the Neelam valley. In May 1999, the Indians madean abortive attempt to occupy the Shyocksectoron the Pakistan side of the LoC.
The occupation of SiachenGlaciersneed a mention here, because all recent Indo-Pakconflictswere caused by the Indian unlawful occupation of this land. It is undoubtly , the world’s highest and most difficult battlefield. Some glaciers are as high as 24,000 ft, andformiles around, there is no question of any human population. The people in India and Pakistan have heard a lot about Siachen but not many could feel the touch of it. When the winds blow at 22,000 ft, in perpetual frozen areas, the bite is killing. In these mountains live the soldiers, where one wrong step could make a difference between life and death. Such is the prize which India chose to win. They learnt bitter lessons soon after, but it became a matter of prestige , too difficult to stay and impossible to quit Ñ certainly very costly in terms of lives and resources. The logistics is so costly that Indians are spending about 3.5 crore rupees per day to supply provisions andammunitiontotheir soldiers. PakistanÕs expenditure is about one-fifth of this.
Pakistan and India have fought three wars in efforts to change this Line of Control. Many more wars, including the latest in Kargilhavebeen avoided with a thin margin.
Although when it comes to occupation of lands or bothering the neighbours, India has an unprecendented record, all its efforts have resulted in a gradual decline in the living standard of the people of South Asia.
An analysis of the cost conflict gives substance to this statement. In 1990, India spent $30.2 billion on its military alone. Between 1989 and 1991, Indians rate of growth declined by 40% while its level of debtnessincreased by over 20%. PakistanÕs economy is in much more troubles. In 1992-1993 Pakistan spent $ 3 billion on defence. The defence expenditure ate up 70% of the government revenue, leaving very little for social development andeconomicprosperity. Apparently, there is no chance of a peaceful co-existence without a proper solution of this Line of Control, which ultimately would mean a decent and acceptable solution of Kashmir.
There shall be a bright day when Pakistan and India shall get rid of this Line of Control problem. People of South Asia andmanymorepeople of the world are anxiously waiting for that day. Every rising sun in Pakistan brings a message that the day of peace is getting closer. Hopefully we hear a similar message from the Indian side.
Appendix 3
“Kashmir and the Arrogance of Ignorance,” #325 – “Coup in Pakistan-An Expert’ Initial Observations.”
References:
[1] Selig S. Harrison, To Push A Kashmir Settlement, Lean On Pakistan, International Herald Tribune, August 24, 2000
[2]Map of Kargil Incursionin Adobe PDF file as separate attachment Free Adobe Acrobat Reader can be downloaded from http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/readstep.html
The confrontation between India and Pakistan over Kashmir may be the most dangerous in the world. It is the world’s only shooting conflict wherein both belligerents have nuclear weapons. It is also a conflict about which most Americans, including me, know next to nothing, and there is growing pressure for the Great Nanny State to get involved. In the interest of learning more about this dangerous dispute, this comment continues Professor Harold Gould’s discussion of Kashmir Question [see #377 and #325].
Recall that Prof Gould introduced us to the complexities of Kashmir Question by critiquing the proposal put forth by Congressman David Bonior proposal that the US intervene and broker another peace process [see Comment #377].
Boniorarguedina31 July op-ed that the unilateral cease fire called by Kashmiri-based guerrillas (Hizb-ul-Mujahidin – hereafter called the Hizbul) presented America witha unique opportunity to ease tensions in the world’s most dangerous conflict. But one of the premises underpinning Bonior’sargumentwas the questionable belief that General PervezMusharraf, Pakistan’s leader, was trying to halt the insurgency in Kashmir andwantedtoopen discussions with India to reach a settlement.
Gould countered by saying that Bonior’s proposal betrayed a blatant anti-Indian bias that was rooted in flawed perceptions left over from great power politics of the Cold War.
In fact, the Hizbul cease fire collapsed a week after Bonior’sop-ed, becauseHizbulallegedIndia refused to allow Pakistan’s participation in the talks. This simple allegation may have masked a far more complex situation, as suggested by Musharraf’s immediate belligerent reaction, ”Pakistan stands united with its Kashmiri brothers andsistersintheir just cause,” …l ”andwillcontinue to extendall moral, diplomatic andpoliticalsupport to their indigenous struggle against state-sponsored terrorism.” This quote is, to say the least, at variance with Bonior’ssimplistic premise
In Reference 1, Selig Harrison takes a very different view of Musharraf’s motives in an op-ed published in the International Herald Tribune on August 24. I will now briefly summarize his points, but I urge you to read his op-ed in its entirety.
Harrison argues in that Islamic extremists based in Pakistan sabotaged the recent cease fire overture by the indigenous Kashmiri Hizbul guerrillas. Like Bonior, Harrison thinks the US has a window of opportunity to become involved in a peace making, albeit in concert with the international community. Instead of accepting Bonior’santi-Indian bias, Harrison advocates putting the squeeze on Pakistan by stiffening restrictions on IMF debt re-scheduling as well as new financial aid. He says the US is reluctant to do this becauseofafearthateconomic restrictions could collapse Pakistan’s already sagging economy. Finally, Harrison’s recommendations are not one-sided; he would also squeeze India by arguing that any long lasting solution would have to award greater autonomy to Kashmir.
Harrison’s more balanced argument leads to a two-staged formula for a lasting peace, which he claims Kashmiris on bothsides seem to favor: (1) Kashmir should remain within India’s constitutional and defenseframework, but with a degree of autonomy bordering on independence. (2) Pakistan keeps the portion of Kashmir it has occupied since the 1947 de-facto partition in the first India-Pakistan war.
Will such a plan work, or are we being fed another dose of the Arrogance of Ignorance?
Not having a clue to the answer to this question, I asked my friendProfessorHarold Gould of the University of Virginia what he thought of Harrison’s proposal. Here is Gould’s response. As you will see, this issue is far more complex than it appears, and it has many subtle twists and turns, but in the end, Gould agrees that Harrison’s viewpoint is far more substantive than Bonior’s:
Gould’s Analysis of the Harrison Proposal
Chuck-Selig Harrison is an excellent scholar-journalist who has been writing andcommenting on SouthAsiaandotherparts of Asia for aroundfourdecades. The attributions to the conclusion of his recent International Herald Tribune article provide information about his current status. I believe he commenced his career on South Asian Affairs when he was NYT correspondent there back in the 1950s.
Regarding the content of this article, I must say at the outset that Selig (or ‘Sig’, as he is called) has got his facts right and his analysis mostly right.
His point that the present Pakistan government is being held hostage to Islamic militant groups in the country is correct. His claim that “five of the generals in [Musharraf's] inner circle are powerful sympathizers” with the militants puts a bit of a quantitative face on the depths of the threat to his continuation in power.
Harrison sees Musharraf as trying to survive by “appeasing” these factions.
One question that arises, however, is the extent to which Musharraf is appeasing these elements as opposed to tacitly being sympathetic to and complicit in their militancy.
To be sure, Musharraf’s behavior can be viewed as appeasing the militants as long as one remains focused on his immediate interests, specifically, the degree to which he will do whatever it takes to remain in power. All politicians in positions of paramount power, especially dictators, pursue this aim with whatever resources they command.
But Musharraf also PROFITS from the specter of powerful militants in his circle. I believe it gives him an excuse for having his political cake and eating it to.
To understand my hypothesis about Musharraf’s strategy, it is necessary to go back to the KargilIncursionand its relationship to Musharraf’s rise to power.
THE KARGIL INCURSION
[Comment: The map below orients the reader to geography of the Kargil Incursion. Reference 2is an Adobe PDF file of same map for thosereaders with email browsers that read imbedded figures. In May 1999, Pakistani sponsored forces attempted to open a new infiltration route in the Kargil area and cut-off the Srinagar-Leh road (in blue), the lifeline of the Indian Army running parallel to the Line of Control. India claimed the infiltrators were made up of Pakistani army regulars (masquerading as Mujahideen) and a sprinkling of Mujahideen, specially trained and equipped by Pakistan in 40 staging camps near the Line of Control (LoC). CS]
Musharraf was one of the principal architects of the Kargil incursion. Militant groups supported by Musharraf’s faction in the Pakistani military infrastructure and the intelligence apparatus (ISI) executed the infiltration operation behind the back of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, presenting Sharif a fait accompli. Sharif, despite his many faults, was inclining toward some kindofrapprochement with India. Recall that I made this point on 15 October 1999 in a memo first published on your D-N-I web site [see Comment #325]. Although this argument was poopoohed at the time, it has been subsequently confirmed.
Shariftriedtowriggle out of his loss of legitimacy in the aftermath of Kargil. He fired his military Commander in Chief (Gen. Jehangir Karamat), who, ironically, had opposed the incursion. He then appointed Musharraf in his place, in effect, letting the fox into the chicken coop.
Shortly thereafter, Musharraf staged a successful coup. He threw Sharif into the slammer, tried him a rigged court, and sentenced him to life in prison.
So, the military prevailed in Pakistani politics, as it has done repeatedly, whenever the country’s weakly developed civilian political institutions have lapsed into a crisis. But, as in the past, military rule is already showing signs of faltering, because generals are simply not a viable substitute for democratic institutions.
An observation by Pervez Hoodbhoy, a thoughtfulPakistanijournalist, in Dawn (Karachi, Oct 16. 1999) is worth noting in this regard:
“While the motives for demanding an immediate return to democracy are perfectly understandable and laudable, this demand is based on an inadequate recognition of one fact so important that it overshadows all else. State power in Pakistan has always been distributed so that key goals have been set and prioritized by the military, and civilian governments have had the job of implementing them. This unnatural separation between goal-making and execution makes for a system that has crashed frequently in the past, and is destined to keep crashing in the future. The military has sometimes been invisible, and at other times visible, but has been ever-present as the hand behind the system. At this critical juncture of Pakistan’s history it needs to accept responsibility for having contributed to the country’s present political and economic situation, and be permitted to lead it out of the morass. My contention is that setting up a caretaker government will be a fruitless endeavor doomed to fail.”
HAVING HIS CAKE AND EATING IT TOO
The unnatural separation between military goal making and civilian execution is the key to understanding why Musharraf’s present conduct can be interpreted as an attempt to preserve a increasingly shaky dictatorship.
On the one hand, Musharraf helped to create the Islamic militancy problem in Pakistan by using Islamic militants as an instrumentality in the Kargil invasion. Moreover, by continuing to support the insurgency in Kashmir, Musharraf is able to fuel and sustain the politico-military instability that besets the region.
On the other hand, the continuing instability plays into his hands domestically and internationally: Domestically, it appeases the Islamic militants in Pakistan, while at the same time enabling Musharraf to claim he is protecting the more secular elements in Pakistan from the Talibanization of society. Internationally, he plays on the same fear of Talibanization (which he helped to create) to induce the United States and other Western powers into supporting his regime economically and diplomatically and tilt against India.
This is what I mean when I argue he is pursuing a strategy of trying to have his cake and eat it too.
So, I agree with Selig Harrison’s recommendation that the United States should not succumb to Musharraf’s political blackmail by offering him economic and other assistance. As Harrison avers, withholding aid “would strengthen, not weaken, General Musharraf’s ability to pursue more restrained [and one might add, sensible] policies.”
One might go even further and declare that a TalibanizedPakistan, if indeed this should happen, would in the endprovetobe no more unmanageable’ than a Musharraf-led Pakistan that disintegrates due to the dictator’s inability to cope withthefactional forces that are undermining his ability to revitalize civil society or employ the country’s economic resources (both domestic andincoming) to successfully turn the economy around.
The decision by the Hizb-ul-Mujahidintodeclare a unilateral cease-fire andtryforan agreement with India over Kashmir raises at least two additional interesting issues, however.
THE QUESTION OF TIMING
First, the sequence of events surrounding this peace initiative needs to be carefully appraised.
The received wisdom, enunciated by Harrison and aucourantin the State Department, is that the cease fire proposal was merely a tactic employed by the Hizbul to gain an advantage over the competing insurgent factions “that have been receiving greater support from Pakistani intelligence agencies.”
This may be indeed the main reason for Hizbul’sceasefire gambit, but before one shapes a policy grounded on this belief, an alternative hypothesis is worth considering.
Perhaps the Hizbul gambit was itself a Pakistani intelligence maneuver whose purposewas to provide an opportunity for the Musharraf regime to acquire official standing at any bargaining table. This condition would have been created had negotiations actually occurred between India and this insurgent faction. But it is the timing of “when Islamabad pressured Hizbultomakeits offer contingent on Pakistan’s participation in the proposed talks” that is crucial here. Given his political situation, Musharraf’s pursuit of legitimacy in the face of the perils to his domestic survival might well have lain behind such a maneuver.
THE QUESTION OF ‘DE-COLONIZATION” (i.e., AUTONOMY)
Second, there is the question of the eventual disposition of Kashmir itself through whatever bargaining process ultimately takes place.
It is interesting to see authorities like Harrison now strongly advocating a greater measure of autonomy for Kashmir as a necessary basis for building peace in the region.
To be fair, all critics of both India and Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute have pointed out that the people of Kashmir deserve to receive a greater role in the determination of their political fate. But until very recently, this matter received superficial treatment by all parties. One of the reasons for this has been the assumption that the indigenous Kashmiris are insufficiently politically developed to be serious players in the bargaining process.
Such a viewpoint reflects a dominant colonialist mentality of the Indians and the Pakistanis as well as Westerners.
A number of parallels exist between the fate of Palestinian and Kashmiri Muslims that help to illuminate this importance of changing this mentality. I suggested as much in two articles published seven years ago (Times of India, Nov 5, 1993 and India Abroad , Dec 3, 1993):
At that time, I argued that “The net result of the failure of the policy on Kashmir by all relevant parties is that the political situation there is now structurally analogous to that in Palestine. Both are at an impasse which can only be resolved by entirely new thinking which recognizes the fact that the legacy of bitterly acquired and sustained fixed attitudes by all parties which led to this impasse must be set aside before any further progress can be made …
” … the first step … must be to recognize that the Muslims of Kashmir have achieved a new political identity that will have to be factored into subsequent negotiations … The capacity of the Palestinians to transform themselves into a politically indigestible entity through the mechanism of the Intifada finally forced a broad enough spectrum of Israeli public opinion to accept that which had hitherto been inconceivable to them – viz., that the leadership which the Movement had spawned could neither be suppressed nor wished away. It forced the middle-classes andmoderates in both societies to seek a way out even if it meant that the old dogmas (Israel’s refusal to recognize the existence of the PLO; the PLO’s refusal to recognize the existence of Israel) had to be abandoned. Israel and the Palestinians bit the bullet, so to speak. India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris must do the same …
“Whether or not it is called Intifada, Kashmir’s Muslims have employed tactics similar to those employedbythe Palestinians to successfully transform themselves into a new type of political force that neither India nor Pakistan can deal with in the old ways. They have already permanently altered the social order in the Valley by driving out the Pandits [Brahmans] who had dominated its cultural and political life for centuries and had relegated Muslims to subordinate status in their caste hierarchy. They have brought all normal government and administration in Kashmir to a virtual standstill and have defied all attempts by the Indian government to restore order either by the carrot or the knout …
“In a very real sense, the roots of these troubles lay not in the act of accession per se, but in the fact that the Muslim masses in Kashmir really did not have a meaningful voice in that act, any more than they did when Pakistan decided to mount an invasion of their country in order to “save” them. Others acted “for” them and took their assent for granted …
“As in Palestine, this voicelessness, this second-class citizenship in their own country, created the soil in which increasingly radical and intransigent protest grew. And there can be no doubt that the techniques developed by the Palestinians, who were perceived to be in a structurally comparable situation, acted as the model for this new wave of grass-roots mobilization … “
Since 1993, the failure to recognize and accept the politically indigestible character of the emergent Kashmiri polity has in fact resulted in the escalation of violence to a level that now transcends Intifada andmorecloselyapproximates Northern Ireland prior to the precarious settlement that was recently achieved there.
The current situation in Kashmir is, in fact, far more dangerous than in Northern Ireland or Palestine for at least three reasons: (1) the two states competing for supremacy in Kashmir are nuclear powers, (2) a series of shaky Pakistani regimes have found that promoting terrorism and insurgency in Kashmir helps to deflect social discontent at home, and (3) Indian politics has gravitated toward Hindu chauvinism through the 1990s.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
I believe Harrison is correct in concluding a combination of partition along the existing line of control, plus “a degree of autonomy bordering on independence,” is “the only realistic basis for a long-term settlement.”
Ironically, such a settlement could have been had as early as 1946, at the time of the Partition that created India and Pakistan as separate states. This is what the most important Kashmiri leader of that time, Sheikh Abdullah (the father of Dr. Farooq Abdullah, the present chief minister of Kashmir), wanted. For this reason, Sheikh Abdullah was imprisoned by the Maharaja prior to Independence, distrusted by the Pakistanis at the time of their proxy invasion of Kashmir, and following Independence again imprisoned by the Indians for fourteen years.
Now it is clear that Farooq is evolving toward the same position that his father held. This is the inevitable manifestation of a Kashmiri identity that is continuing to evolve even as we speak.
The legacy of Cold War politics and US involvement in the Kashmir dispute was discussed in my earlier essay on Kashmir [Comment #377] and need not be repeated here, other than to say that an eventual solution CANNOT be engineered or brokered by the United States.
Our past policies make it impossible for the principals to view us as a neutral broker in this dispute.
Only India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people can make the peace. It has to come from within.
Professor Harold A. Gould
Center for South Asian Studies,
University of Virginia
Chuck Spinney
[Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only.]
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Appendix 3
Was Indira Gandhi low on oxygen in Leh to have ordered Siachen fiasco? Jawed Naqvi
Monday, 23 Mar, 2009 | 04:25 AM PST A seemingly intractable problem stalking India and Pakistan is their inability to say sorry, mea culpa, andmove on. The mulish tendency has led to absurd levels of crises, including nuclear close calls, which would be considered anathema in most cases even among very hostile neighbours.
Conciliatory efforts are discouraged. I remember the bemused face of a Pakistani delegate at a Track III peace conference in Delhi weeks after both countries went crazy with their nuclear tests. He tried to confess that Pakistan had made mistakes by fomenting terrorism in Kashmir. Then he waited for someone from among the Indians to comfort the Pakistanis with their confession. That never happened.
What he got instead was a pat on the back: “You are right, Pakistan has been seriously remiss in helping terrorism. They need to stop it.” There was no word about India being guilty over human rights or anything else that would have helped the conversation to continue productively. The drought of a balanced andsensitive Indian narrative seems to have ended after a long time with a trenchant critique by a former Indian army officer of his country’s Siachen policy.
The title of this week’s dateline flows from a remark by Colonel Pavan Nair in his biting analysis in the latest issue of the Economic and Political Weekly of the unending fiasco in the Siachen glacier. Nair is a retired officer of the Indian army who served for 30 years in the army corps of engineers and saw active service in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Kashmir. His views on Siachen were fortified by his visit to the glacier, which is commonly known as the world’s highest battlefield.
It was on 13thApril 1984, close to a quarter century ago, that a small body of troops was heli-dropped on Saltoro Ridge, which overlooks the Siachen glacier, along its western fringe. Within a few days, a company-size force occupied three passes on the ridgeline located at altitudes between 18,000 and 20,000 feet. Meghdoot, the code name given to the operation, was to become the Indian army’s longest running operation.
Nair’s account of the events has come at a time when the two countries are experiencing a bad trough in their turbulent relationship. But that is precisely what makes the account so rivetting. It brings out the absurd and self-defeating politics, mostly bereft of any military logic that underpins key aspects of their ties.
Within weeks of Indians landing there, Pakistani troops occupied positions on the lower slopes of Saltoro to opposethe Indian occupation. Skirmishing commenced for better tactical positions. What started as a small operation soon became a major military confrontation between the two. In just over a year, the force level on bothsides reached brigade-plus size till the entire ridgeline covering a frontage of over a 100 kilometres was occupied.
In Nair’s own words till the mid-1990s, pitched infantry battles were fought to gain dominating positions. Artillery duels were a part of the daily routine till November 2003 when a ceasefire came into effect. The logistics of maintaining troops at altitudes above 18,000 feet are mind-boggling. Posts have to be supplied by helicopters and evacuation of casualties is at times not possible due to bad weather.
On the Indian side, over a 1,000 soldiers have been killed and over 3,000 permanently disabled, mostly by the effect of the altitude and weather. On the Pakistani side, says Nair, the casualties are heavier since most of the attacks were launched by them.
In spite of a durable ceasefire, troops continue to occupy positions at punishing heights on both sides of the line and suffer casualties almost on a daily basis. Over a period of 25 years, the presence of thousands of troops in the vicinity of the glacier has caused severe environmental degradation of an ecosystem already affected by climate change. Thousands of tonnes of military garbage andhuman waste lie dumped in the area. Nair estimates that about 200 tonnes of carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere each day due to burning of fuel for cooking, warming and transportation of men and material by land and air. India andPakistan spend a million dollars a day to maintain troops in Siachenwhen their human indicators are comparable with sub-Saharan Africa.
Nair has looked for reasons that prompted prime minister Indira Gandhi to give the go-ahead for an operation which in his view was a clear and blatant violation of the Simla Agreement? Why did the military leadership of the day render advice that resulted in the occupation of an area, which had remained vacant for 37 odd years during which three wars were fought between India and Pakistan?
Giving the background to the dispute, Nair recalls that the Ceasefire Line between India and Pakistan was demarcated by the Karachi Agreement signed in July 1949 under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). The northern-most part of the line ended at Khor and remained undemarcatedthereafter with a remark that the line would run “thence north to the glaciers”.
It is interesting to note that the background to the Siachendispute may have been entirely clerical in nature. As Nair observes, during the 1962 operations with China, Jawaharlal Nehru asked for American military aid. US transport aircraft flew supplies and clothing into Leh. The US Defence Mapping Agency noted that maps of the region showed a line ending in the middle of nowhere, so they extended the line in the general direction it was running as far as the Chinese boundary.
Nair comes down hard on the media as well as the civil society for not doing their bit to bring to tragedy of Siachen on the public radar. Both the media and civil society, he says, have played a limited role in debating the issue, except to state the official position and in some cases bring out the difficult conditions faced by the soldiers. A few years ago, Shekhar Gupta of the Indian Express conducted a televised interview of the defence minister, George Fernandes; on the glacier. Conflict resolution did not come up for discussion. Media persons are flown to the base camp in helicopters, given a briefing, shown some equipment and training and flown out.
This, says Nair, is what embedded journalism is about. Not a single journalist has visited any post on Saltoro Ridge in the past 25 years. No one has spent even a single night to get a feel of what the soldiers undergo for several months. The press produces pictures and articles showing soldiers dressed in pristine white climbing vertical snow faces. This may be inspiring stuff for young people wanting to sign up for an adventurous life but hardly reflects the reality of the sub-human conditions the soldiers endure. There is even a television jingle based on the national anthem shot in Siachen.
For the past two years, media persons have been allowed to trek up to Kumar basewhich is the advanced base on the glacier for reaching the northern passes. A few journalists have noticed the extensive pollution and the poor healthof the soldiers who return from the posts. They have reported this, yet the reason for continuing with the occupation of the Siachen heights remains largely unquestioned.
The decision to occupy the heights which dominate the Siachen glacier, was taken by Indira Gandhi after a controversial military briefing held at Leh sometime in September 1983. Neither the army chief nor the defence minister was present. The unilateral military occupation of a part of the line, even if it was undemarcated, was a blatant violation of the Simla Agreement, says Nair. Indira Gandhi would have surely known that, but she took a decision based on incorrect military advice.
Why diplomatic channels were not used needs further study andexamination. It is possible that Indira Gandhi did not want to parley with Zia ul Haq. It is also possible that her judgment was clouded by the effect of the altitude at Leh.
In this season of drought of worthwhile and positive ideas to bring the old adervsariestogether, Nair not only breaks new ground but also raises the prospect of a wider dicussionon what is to be done. We await a meaningful repsonse from a knowledgable analyst from Pakistan. jawednaqvi@gmail.com
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/Dawn%20Content%20Library/dawn/the-newspaper/columnists/was-indira-gandhi-low-on-oxygen-in-leh-to-have-ordered-siachen-fiasco
Gwadar Port on the Baluch coast
Step one: Current day Pakistan
That, Rabita Trust of Bangladesh managed by Wael Hamza Julaidan in collaboration with the Muslim World League and the International Islamic Relief Organization as well as the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce reportedly masterminds the move to transform the NE India region into an Islamic State which will be assimilated into Bangladesh to form “Bangistan” or “Greater Bangladesh.”
